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INTRODUCTION
In early 1975, a cleaning woman discovered the lifeless body of seventy-five-year-old Inez Phillips stretched out on a bed with a large
1
butcher knife “protruding from her upper chest.” An unknown assailant had bound and gagged the elderly widow with duct tape,
stabbed her repeatedly, and then crushed in the back of her skull
2
with a blunt instrument. The murder reverberated throughout the
victim’s small, close-knit Gladewater, Texas community because of its
remarkable brutality. Police investigations led officers to focus on Joseph Stanley Faulder, a local vagrant. After his arrest, Faulder confessed to the crime. He was subsequently convicted of killing Mrs.
3
Phillips. Although this conviction was set aside because of the introduction at trial of an improperly obtained confession, Faulder was retried, convicted again by a jury, and sentenced to death. Inez Phillips’s murder and the ensuing conviction of Joseph Faulder might
not stand out among similar heinous crimes save for one important
fact: an individual hired by the Phillips family, a privately retained
prosecutor, tried the case against the defendant and secured the con4
viction.
Although public prosecutors handled Faulder’s initial prosecution, after Faulder’s capital conviction was overturned on appeal, the
murder victim’s son hired private attorneys to investigate and then to
5
re-prosecute the defendant. When the defense counsel objected to
*
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this unique arrangement, arguing the impropriety of permitting the
victim’s family to control the prosecution, the private prosecutors—
one of whom was the former district attorney who had tried the defendant previously—obtained a written appointment from the district
attorney’s office designating the privately-retained counsel as special
6
volunteer prosecutors. The Texas state and federal courts upheld
7
the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court denied Fauld8
er’s petition for certiorari review.
Murder prosecutions—especially where the possibility of capital
punishment looms—rank as the most serious within the American
9
criminal justice system. What doubtless comes as a surprise to the
experienced criminal justice practitioner, however, is that a private
prosecutor could litigate Mr. Faulder’s criminal trial. Indeed, when
the criminal justice system is considered, most people, including
members of the bar and the screenwriters for Law & Order, think only
of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor—whether directly
elected by the people or appointed by the people’s representatives—
has become the “central actor in the criminal justice system.” In fact,
“the American prosecutor enjoys an independence and discretionary
10
privileges unmatched in the world.” Few understand, however, that
public prosecutors were not always the dominant figures in the prosecution of criminal trials. Fewer still realize that even today several
states authorize the hiring or appointment of private attorneys to
prosecute criminal cases. Despite the persistence of private prosecutors, little has been written about their history or potential value to
the criminal justice system. Generally, what has been written is critical of the practice, arguing that it is the vestige of a bygone era and
incompatible with the modern values that define today’s criminal justice system. The aim of this Article is to challenge that position.
This Article will examine the history and constitutionality of the
private prosecution of criminal cases and assess the potential value of
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Id.
Id. at 517 (rejecting defendant’s habeas petition and explaining that defendant had been
convicted, and lost on direct appeal).
Faulder v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 995 (1996).
See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for
Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (discussing retributivists’ concerns
about erroneously sentencing to death an innocent person); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1844–50 (2000)
(discussing through statistics the possibility of error in capital punishment).
Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District
Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 568 (1984) (citation omitted).
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privately retained prosecutors to the justice system. It is my contention that private prosecutions can be a useful adjunct to the more
familiar public model, potentially freeing up scarce public resources
while at the same time vindicating the interests—both of the victim
and the public—in the enforcement of the criminal law. It is widely
acknowledged that the state possesses limited resources to allocate to
11
the criminal justice system. Those resources, in turn, must be divided among crime prevention activities, police officers, investigative
functions (such as crime labs), courts, prisons, rehabilitation programs, probation and parole officers, and myriad other responsibilities that make up the criminal justice system. Enforcement is only
one element of the criminal justice portfolio. Individual victims and
select communities—whether comprised of home owners or stores
within a shopping mall—may have interests that overlap with those of
the state, but which may nevertheless be distinct from those of the
state and deserve vindication. Similarly, if the state is able to conserve
resources otherwise allocated to prosecutions, it might better be positioned to target resources to other under-resourced areas. In the
same way in which the actions of private individuals competing in the
free market may benefit the society as a whole, if private resources
can be tapped to enforce criminal statutes, the public at large may
benefit as the result of those individual efforts.
In Part I of this Article, I trace the history of criminal prosecution,
demonstrating that public prosecutors did not always play the dominant role in the adjudication of criminal cases. I examine both the
English and the American experience with private prosecutors, noting that private prosecutions remain common in present-day England
12
even as they have all but withered away in the United States.

11

12

See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 76–77 (2008) (describing resource allocation inherent in the criminal
justice system); Thomas P. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal—Report of the Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, 49 FED. LAW. 40, 44 (2002) (discussing proposed state criminal
reforms, and weighing the costs with respect to the state budget); Ross E. Wiener, InterBranch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 363, 383, 412 (2001) (explaining the role U.S. Attorneys play
in the “inevitable rationing of limited resources”).
See Douglas Hay, Controlling the English Prosecutor, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 165, 180 (1983)
(stating that, by not including police in the private prosecution numbers, “[f]ewer than
three percent of defendants are prosecuted by private individuals”); Patrick M. Fahey,
Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REV. 205, 208
(1992) (contrasting the legitimacy of private prosecution of crime in Great Britain with
the disapproval of private prosecution of crime in the United States); Michael T. McCormack, Note, The Need for Private Prosecutors: An Analysis of Massachusetts and New Hampshire
Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 497, 500–01 (2004) (“According to a 1960 study, the Director
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In Part II, I examine the contemporary role of private prosecutors
in the United States, finding that a number of states permit—whether
by common law tradition or express statute—privately retained lawyers to pursue criminal cases. I also consider the function of private
justice in federal law, focusing on the establishment of qui tam actions
and the creation of private attorneys general to enforce specific federal statues.
In Part III, I analyze the doctrinal basis for the private prosecution
of criminal cases, determining whether under current standards of
due process and equal protection, such prosecutions remain constitutionally permissible. While sensitive to the real issues privately managed prosecutions may pose to the criminal justice system, I nevertheless conclude that they survive constitutional scrutiny. Similarly, I
explore prudential arguments against private criminal law enforcement, focusing on both the ethical considerations swirling around
private prosecutors as well as the general ulitity of private law enforcement schemes.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the use of private prosecutors is
likely to have a beneficial effect upon the criminal justice system and
thus offer the contours of a model statute. Turning to the policy arguments for permitting the private prosecution of criminal cases, I
note that private prosecutors may prove useful in trying cases that
may otherwise go unnoticed by the system, may help relieve the burdens of overworked public prosecutorial offices, and allow the use of
expert prosecutors in particularly complex cases, such as in criminal
trademark or patent cases. If nothing else, leveraging private resources to fund criminal investigations and prosecutions will have a
beneficial effect upon deterrence strategies. This benefit rests upon
the Berccarian insight that it is the certainty, not necessarily the sever13
ity, of punishment that deters crime.
The use of private prosecutors, while hardly a complete solution
to the myriad problems confronting our criminal justice system, may
nevertheless be a viable means of expanding prosecutorial resources
and thereby increasing the costs to potential criminals of engaging in
untoward behavior. As Adam Smith understood in discussing the
“invisible hand” that guided free markets, the pursuit of self-interest,

13

of Public Prosecutions handled only eight percent of the prosecutions in Great Britain,
while private prosecutors or police accounted for the other ninety-two percent.”).
See Brian E. Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the
1960’s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743, 762–63 (1977) (finding empirical support for Cesare Beccaria’s “two-hundred-year-old suggestion that certainty of punishment deters more effectively than its severity”).
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rightly understood, can yield benefits for society as a whole as well as
14
for the individual.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION
Traditionally, the aims of the criminal law have been to deter
wrongdoing through the threat of prosecution and subsequent punishment and, when deterrence fails, to recompense the victim and
15
Punishment itself has
provide just punishment to the offender.
been understood to function as a deterrent to prevent conduct society abhors; but when deterrence fails, a court may impose punish16
17
ment to incapacitate the offender, to rehabilitate the offender, or
18
to exist as an end in and of itself. Punishment, however, cannot exist without prosecution.
The criminal justice system exists to provide a forum wherein
wrongs perpetrated by one individual against another may be remediated and social values may be vindicated. Although societies, both
ancient and modern, have selectively enforced criminal laws depending upon the immediate availability of resources and the shifting in19
terests of society, the nature of common law crimes has remained
remarkably stable over time. Murder, rape, theft, and other obvious
criminal acts have long been recognized as “wrongs” in both common
20
law and civil law jurisdictions.

14
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ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 401
(1958). See generally 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 1 (15th ed. 1993)
(examining the general purpose of criminal law).
See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 351–53 (1983) (“Imprisonment puts convicted criminals out of general circulation . . . .”).
See id. (“Punishment may help to reform the criminal so that his wish to commit crimes
will be lessened . . . .”).
See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 225, 253 (1997) (explaining that one theory of punishment “sees the imposition of
deserved punishment as a valuable end in itself, without regard to whether it avoids future crimes”).
See Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 81–85 (1976) (discussing an application of the Roman jurist
Julian’s concept of desuetude); Cynthia B. Herrup, Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century
England, 106 PAST & PRESENT 102, 104–06 (1985) (describing the use of legal discretion
and the actual application of the law in seventeenth-century England); Teemu Ruskola,
Note, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J.
2531, 2564 (1994) (speaking to the practice of selective enforcement of laws in the People’s Republic of China).
W. H. Hitchler, Crimes and Civil Injuries, 39 DICK. L. REV. 23, 23–24 (1934).
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While the nature of common law crimes has remained fairly
steady over time, the manner in which society handles remediation
for criminal behavior has evolved. Western society once generally
21
viewed crime as a harm perpetrated against the individual; hence
crimes were prosecuted in much the same way as suits in tort were litigated: individuals squared off in a state-provided forum. Religion,
however, especially in those nations dominated by Christianity, also
22
understood crime to be an offense against God.
Because the
Church represented God on earth, crimes could be seen as offenses
23
against the organization of the Church as well. In an age of the divine right of kings to rule, and—at least in England—of the King’s
position as head of the Church—crime came to be viewed as harm
24
perpetrated against the state. To this end, the state would allow
public prosecutors to press a case against the defendant not only in
25
the victim’s name, but in the King’s name as well. I suspect the
King’s advisors also viewed criminal prosecutions as a means of initiating social control as well as serving as a vehicle to collect revenue.
Nevertheless, the civil justice system remained the more appropriate
avenue for individuals to seek redress for harms perpetrated against
them as individuals.
This theoretical understanding of crime as a harm to the state versus crime as a harm to the victim has crucial practical consequences.
If crime is viewed as a harm principally against the victim, then the
state has no (or only a minor) role in seeking remediation. For example, just as in a civil suit in tort, the state merely provides a forum
wherein the injured party can obtain justice; similarly, in a private
criminal law model, the aggrieved victim (or other interested party)
initiates prosecution and the state serves only as mediator.

21

22

23
24

25

See Dianne Molvig, Violence and the Judicial System: Stemming the Tide of Violence in Our
Courthouses, WIS. LAW., July 1997, at 10, 59 (emphasizing that a “fundamental concept in
human history” is the concept “of crime as a violation against an individual and his or her
family and community”).
See Jordan J. Ballor, To Reform or to Abolish? Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison, and
Restorative Justice, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 481, 502 (2008) (discussing the Christian tradition’s
understanding of crime and sin).
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 187 (1983).
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *269 (“[T]he king shall be reputed the only
supreme head in earth of the church of England . . . .”); Harold J. Berman, The Origins of
Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1666 (1994) (paraphrasing
Richard Hooker’s thoughts on absolute monarchy and divine appointment).
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *298 (discussing modes of prosecution); see also 3 id.
at *254 (inquiring into “the mode of redressing those injuries to which the crown itself is
a party”).
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Although the aim of this Article is not to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the history of private prosecutions in English or American
law, it is important to review briefly the history of criminal prosecutions in general in order to understand the transformation of the
criminal prosecution system from a privately managed system to one
dominated by public officers.
A. The Concept of Private Prosecutions in English Law
Criminal prosecution in England is commonly divided into two
periods: the period before the 1879 Act creating the Office of the
26
Public Prosecutor, and the time period since. Prior to the 1879 Act,
private citizens and non-police agencies tended to dominate criminal
prosecution. During the time period following that Act, however,
public prosecutions began to gain purchase and have since come to
fill the dominant, albeit not exclusive, role in prosecuting crimes.
1. Early England and Privately Managed Criminal Prosecutions
Before the early-nineteenth century, English law recognized that
the victim of a crime was generally responsible for the crime’s prose27
cution. Blackstone discussed the nature of the English “appeal,”
which is not, as is commonly understood in contemporary American
law, a petition to a superior court to remedy an error committed in
an inferior court but, instead, an “original suit” instigated by a “pri28
vate subject against another” to obtain redress for a wrong.
English law erected a rudimentary criminal justice system as a
means to mediate between parties and to allow those wronged to ob29
tain recompense. Under the English system, the victim of a crime

26

27

28
29

See K. W. LIDSTONE ET AL., PROSECUTIONS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND NON-POLICE
AGENCIES 2–3 (1980). A number of articles traverse this same territory, and doubtless in a
more concise and elegant fashion, including Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 359–73 (1986); Thomas J. Robinson, Jr.,
Private Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 300, 300–11
(1968); Andrew Sidman, Comment, Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L.
REV. 754, 756–65 (1976); and W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A
Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 125–37 (1952).
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *161 (“The party offending is here bound, by the
fundamental contract of society, to obey the direction of the legislature, and pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires. The usual application of this forfeiture is either to the party aggrieved . . . .”).
4 id. at *312.
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 40–47 (2003) (discussing structure of pretrial procedure organized by statute).
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30

would prosecute. Professor John Langbein has explained that “the
criminal trial was expected to transpire as a lawyer-free contest of
31
amateurs.” Even in the case of a serious offense, “the prosecution
was . . . not [typically] represented by counsel. The victim of the
32
crime commonly served as prosecutor.” The victim was not entirely
33
alone, however, for the Marian Committal Statute of 1555 empowered local magistrates to issue search and arrest warrants and to order
34
accused persons to be held prior to trial. The warrant effectively indemnifed those conducting the search or effecting the seizure of the
person. Similarly, pre-trial detention prevented the accused from
fleeing and thereby escaping justice. Parliament thus laid the foundation of a rudimentary criminal justice system in which the victim
could search and seize evidence and even arrest the offender without
fear of tort liability. Underlying the criminal justice system of the
time was the view that, since the principal harm was inflicted on the
victim, the victim was in the best position to avenge the wrong:
The fact that the private vengeance of the person wronged by a crime was
the principal source to which men trusted for the administration of criminal justice in early times is one of the most characteristic circumstances
connected with English criminal law, and has had much to do with the
development of what may perhaps be regarded as its principal distinctive
peculiarity, namely the degree to which a criminal trial resembles a pri35
vate litigation.

The sense that justice has been rendered to the victim is not inconsequential—all peoples desire justice. The concept of revenge is as old
as mankind. The state, in providing an orderly means by which justice might be meted out, helps to satiate this yearning for justice:
[N]o stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due
observance of the law of the land . . . than is given by the power . . . of
testing the legality of any conduct of which [the victim] disapproves . . . by a criminal prosecution. Many such prosecutions . . . have
given a legal vent to feelings in every way entitled to respect, and have
decided peaceably, and in an authentic manner, many questions of great
36
constitutional importance.

30

31
32
33
34
35
36

See 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245
(London, MacMillan 1883) (“The history of appeals or accusations by a private person
and trial by battle go together, as trial by battle was an incident of appeals.”).
LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 11.
Id.
2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.).
LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 40–41.
STEPHEN, supra note 30, at 245; see also Cardenas, supra note 26, at 359.
STEPHEN, supra note 30, at 496.
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As in the civil courts, the privately initiated prosecution could
proceed with counsel’s assistance, but counsel was compensated by
37
the victim. To discourage the possibility of a frivolous prosecution,
the law required the approval of a justice of the peace or an indictment by a grand jury before the private prosecution could com38
mence. The grand jury acted “as a filtering mechanism to dispose of
groundless or insubstantial prosecutions, sparing the defendant the
39
peril and indignity of public trial in a transparently weak case.”
If the screening function served to weed out inappropriate or
otherwise malicious prosecutions, then, so did private prosecutions
40
themselves serve as a check upon centralized authority. Certainly,
the Framers of the Bill of Rights recognized the possibility that the
41
government could use criminal prosecution as a tool of oppression;
hence, many provisions of the Bill of Rights may be read as a code of
42
criminal procedure, ensuring the defendant basic procedural rights.
The aim of a criminal prosecution lay not only in justice-asrevenge, however, but also in restitution. Blackstone explained that
the “private process for the punishment of public crimes had probably its origin in those times when a private pecuniary satisfaction,
called a weregild, was constantly paid to the party injured, or his rela43
tions, to expiate enormous offenses.” The weregild was simply the
37

38
39
40

41

42

43

See J. J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 1700–1900, at 119 (1979) (“Fees would
have to be paid to various people to see the prosecution through, and if the prosecutor
had called upon the assistance of a parish constable or someone else, he would be required to share the reward.”).
See LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 45.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
357, 361 (1986) (explaining the view that “a private prosecutorial system was necessary to
limit the power of the Crown”); Hay, supra note 12, at 167 (“One of the crucial safeguards
of the citizenry against an executive contemptuous of liberty was the right of private prosecution.”).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424–50, 661–65, 707–17, 757–59, 766 reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html. Mr. Goodhue, though
not supporting the immediate passage of the Bill of Rights, acknowledges, “it is the wish
of many of our constituents, that something should be added to the Constitution, to secure in a stronger manner their liberties from the inroads of power.” Id. Arguing, instead for the immediate passage of a Bill of Rights, Mr. Madison explains that “if all power is subject to abuse . . . then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the General
Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done.” Id.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997) (identifying specific constitutional provisions as creating a criminal
code of sorts).
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *313. See generally 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at
450–51 (2d ed. 1923).
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price the offender would have to pay to make the victim whole. This
is not unlike a civil suit wherein damages are sought for precisely the
same purpose.
Procedural rules evolved to control private prosecutions. Blackstone noted, for example, that crimes prosecuted by appeal were limited to certain types of heinous offenses committed against a specific
victim or that victim’s property, such as larceny, rape, and murder,
44
and standing was limited only to certain individuals. A man’s murder, for example, could only be prosecuted by the spouse or by a
45
male heir “to the four nearest degrees of blood.” Not unlike a civil
case, then, standing served as a means of limiting the pool of potential complainants who could prosecute a case. Moreover, jeopardy
attached to a private prosecution, and the punishments meted out
46
mirrored those of a case initiated by the King’s attorneys.
Unlike contemporary America, where punishment more often
than not comes in the form of incarceration and making the victim
whole seems to be of secondary concern, English society appeared to
be far more concerned about recompense to the victim than incapacitating the offender. Even capital cases might be settled through
47
bargaining rather than the actual imposition of the death penalty.
In early societies in particular, the value of a human capital was considerable; to remove the offender from society (either by forfeiture of
life or imprisonment) made little sense. Although a victim (or a victim’s family) might have an urge for revenge that might be satiated
only by imposition of the death penalty, there was little else to be
gained if the perpetrator was not in a position to provide restitution—whether through money, forfeiture of property, or indentured
servitude. A private prosecution thus enabled the victim not only to
obtain restitution but also to conclude that he had obtained some
measure of justice.
Despite the predominance of privately managed criminal prosecutions, the King, as sovereign, could elect to intervene in a criminal
trial:
[W]hen . . . his immediate officers were . . . assured that a man had
committed a gross misdemeanor, either personally against the king or his

44
45
46
47

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *314–15.
Id. at *315.
Id.
See Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (describing a “special kind of appeal that was
brought by a convicted criminal who had already been sentenced to hang” whereby the
criminal could have his life spared if he or she “successfully appealed several of his accomplices”).
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government, or against the public peace and good order, they were at liberty . . . to convey that information to the Court of the King’s Bench by
a suggestion on record, and to carry on the prosecution in his majesty’s
48
name.

Even in circumstances in which the Crown was not directly threatened, the King might choose to insert himself in a criminal case.
Professor Langbein has documented that “[g]overnment intervention . . . in noteworthy criminal cases unrelated to affairs of state is
49
well evidenced for the 1750s.” Langbein explains that “when the
central authorities wanted to strengthen a criminal prosecution, they
50
did it by sending in the lawyers.” Despite the occasional intervention by the Crown, however, the private criminal prosecution remained a cornerstone of English law. J. Chitty, in his influential criminal law commentaries, explained the “right” of prosecution:
[E]very man is of common right entitled to prefer an accusation against a
party whom he suspects to be guilty. . . . even an individual who has, for
the purpose of detecting a suspicious person, afforded him an opportunity to commit the particular crime, is not thereby precluded from be51
coming a prosecutor, and instituting proceedings against him . . . .

A preference for private prosecution may be attributed to the slow
development of a centralized system of government or a general re52
luctance to raise taxes to support public prosecutions. A crime involving the conversion of private property, for example, might not be
so disruptive of the public order that the King would feel a sense of
obligation to prosecute a case against the malefactor. Nevertheless,
“the idea of wrong to a person or his kindred is still primary, and that
of offense against the common weal secondary, even in the gravest
53
cases.” It goes without saying that when wronged, the individual victim will feel it far more acutely than the state.
In time, professional societies arose to bear “some of the costs as54
sociated with the risk of being victimized by a serious crime.” Essentially, members paid a subscription fee and, if victimized, could count
on the association to offer a reward and to bear the costs of the inves-

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *309–10.
LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 121.
Id.
1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 1–2 (1816); cf. Robinson, supra
note 26, at 301.
See Klerman, supra note 47, at 45 (detailing the chronology of the private prosecution in
England).
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 43, at 46.
LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 133.
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55

tigation and prosecution of the offense.
Professor Leon Radzinowicz has explained that such societies were established to secure
56
the interests of merchants who might otherwise be victimized.
Communities “weighed” offenses in light of their perceived harm to
the social order. As described by Professor Radzinowicz, monetary
rewards provided to prosecutors for bringing cases involving housebreaking (modern burglary) in the counties of Middlesex and Hertford netted twenty pounds; livestock theft, seven pounds; grand lar57
ceny, five pounds; and petty larceny, three pounds. This is precisely
the sort of “harmfulness weighing” that modern legislatures engage
in to determine the relative severity of punishment for various crimi58
nal offenses.
It is unclear why private prosecutions began to wane; to date, no
one has been able to provide a complete account of their fall from
prominence. The evolving understanding of crime as an offense
against the state doubtless contributed to the decline—this understanding might have been fueled by the state’s decision to seek rents
in the form of criminal fines and to quell concerns with private justice. Over time, the Crown came to shoulder a higher percentage of
criminal prosecutions. Professor Daniel Klerman, in an empirical
analysis of privately initiated prosecutions in thirteenth-century Eng59
land, offers an alternate explanation as to the apparent decline.
Based upon his statistical analysis, Klerman suggests that judicial attitudes towards settlement and pressure to move cases to jury trial,
more than anything, accounted for the decline in private prosecu60
tions. He observes that:
[W]hen judges put nonprosecuted appellees to jury trial, the number of
appeals [private prosecutions] declined. It is possible, however, that the
appeal did not decline in importance because crime victims did not need
to initiate an appeal in order to settle. All they had to do was threaten to
appeal. If such threats resulted in settlement before appeal was initiated
at county court, the king’s suit procedure would not be invoked because

55

56

57
58
59
60

Id. at 133. Professor Langbein provides the interesting example of a 1770 Association of
“several Gentlemen, Tradesmen, Farmers and others of the County of Nottingham, To
Prosecute Horse Stealers.” Id. at 132.
2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1750, at 116–19 (1948). For a discussion of those societies, see Thomas J. Robinson, Jr., Comment, Private Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L.
REV. 300, 302–03 (1968).
2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 56, at 125.
See generally WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 26 (1992) (discussing development of retributivism).
Klerman, supra note 47, at 47–48, 53–55.
Id. at 57–58.
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it was only triggered if an appeal was initiated. In addition, such threats
to appeal, even if followed by settlement, would not be mentioned in legal records. It is thus possible that although the number of recorded appeals dropped, the number of preappeal settlements rose, so that the
overall social impact of appeals and settlements induced by the threat of
61
appeals remained constant.

While the exact reasons for the decline remain shrouded by history,
certainly private prosecutions, not unlike civil tort actions, might be
expected to encourage settlements prior to trial. Such cases would
not have been recorded; hence the perceived decline may not have
been a real decline.
One might further speculate that the emergence of the associations designed to incentivize the prosecution of certain offenses,
coupled with the burgeoning understanding that criminal offenses
were also breaches against the state (perhaps leavened by the state’s
realization that it might be able to have a slice of any restitution pro62
vided to victims as well as fines directly payable to the state itself) led
to the establishment of public prosecutors. General tax revenue
came to support public prosecution, thereby obviating the need for
any special associations or guilds to bear the cost of prosecution. In
1879, Parliament passed the Prosecution of Offenses Act, which
(among other things) established an office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions “to institute, undertake, or carry on such criminal proceedings . . . and to give such advice and assistance to chief officers of
police, clerks to justices, and other persons . . . concerned in any
63
criminal proceeding.” As noted, however, “[t]his act conferred no
sweeping official powers on the Director, but merely gave him powers
of [a] very technical nature . . . amounting to little more than those
64
of a private prosecutor.” Although Parliament fiddled with the office over the years (including abolishing it altogether and then resurrecting it), subsequent legislative enactments clarified that
”[n]othing in the Prosecution of Offences Act[] . . . shall preclude
any person from instituting or carrying on any criminal proceedings,
but the Director of Public Prosecutions may undertake at any stage
65
the conduct of those proceedings if he thinks fit.” Thus, while the
right of private prosecution remained, its scope was trimmed by the

61
62
63
64
65

Id.
See id. at 6 (discussing shift from paying injured kin to paying the “church, king, or community at large”).
42 & 43 Vict., c. 22, § 2 (1879) (Eng.).
Robinson, supra note 56, at 306.
Prosecution of Offenses Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 3, § 2(3) (Eng.).
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acknowledgment that the public prosecutor possessed plenary authority to intercede in a private prosecution or to quash it altogether.
2. The Contemporary Function of Private Prosecutors in England
Although privately initiated prosecutions remain commonplace in
66
England, what constitutes a “private” prosecution is somewhat different from the way in which such prosecutions are understood in the
United States. In England, the term “private prosecution” has come
67
to mean a prosecution not formally involving the police. Local governments, governmental agencies, trade and professional associa68
tions, and individuals all may bring private prosecutions.
69
Following the 1985 adoption of the Prosecution of Offenses Act,
the English crown began to shoulder a greater burden of conducting
criminal prosecutions. While the police may assist the private complainant in a private prosecution, oftentimes the Crown may intercede in a matter of significant public interest. If, for example, the
crime is one of violence or a breach of the public order, the police
will become the official complainant, and the government will handle
70
the case. However, the Prosecution of Offenses Act did not end the
practice of privately initiated prosecutions. Such prosecutions re71
main a cornerstone of the English criminal justice system.
Although the individual’s right to commence and maintain a private prosecution was preserved under the Prosecution of Offenses
72
Act, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was nonetheless granted
considerable authority to take over, end, or otherwise control a private prosecution. The CPS’s own website, however, acknowledges
that:
[T]here is nothing wrong in allowing a private prosecution to run its
course through to verdict and, in appropriate cases, sentence. The fact
that a private prosecution succeeds is not an indication that the case
should have been prosecuted by the CPS. Parliament has specifically al-

66
67
68
69
70

71
72

See generally LIDSTONE, supra note 26, at 15 (exploring the significant minority of cases in
which the police are not the prosecutors).
See RICHARD J. STAFFORD, PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS, Introduction (1989) (discussing private
prosecutions in contemporary England).
See id.
Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 3(2) (Eng.).
The Crown Prosecution Service, Public Order Offences Incorporating the Charging
Standard, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2010).
See Abraham S. Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1286, 1286 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, § 6(1) (Eng.).
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lowed for this possibility by the way section 6 is constructed: there is no
73
requirement for the CPS to take over a private prosecution.

The standards under which the CPS might supplant a private prosecution are identified as situations in which “either the evidential sufficiency stage [a patently frivolous prosecution] or the public interest
stage [in other words, society must have some sort of stake in the
prosecution] . . . is not met”; or “the prosecution is vexatious” (a malicious prosecution or one in which any rational prosecutor would
74
forgo bringing a case).
The circumstances under which the CPS takes over and continues
a private prosecution involve those instances in which there is sufficient evidence to maintain a prosecution and such a case is in the
75
public interest. Arguably, while a prosecution may be in the public
interest, institutional, cultural, or fiscal concerns may prevent the
case from going forward. The avenue of the personally initiated private prosecution exists to redress institutional failings. In 2007, for
example, police failed to prosecute the murder of a young black man
76
from Liverpool, Stephen Lawrence. The family, as well as a number
of commentators, argued that the failure to prosecute the case could
be attributed to lingering racism. The family therefore initiated a
77
private prosecution to seek justice for their murdered son. Private
prosecutions thus remain a vital part of the English criminal justice
78
system.
B. Prosecutions in the Colonies and Early America
Mirroring the English view of considering crime to be a private
79
concern, private criminal prosecutions in the American colonies
appear to have been commonplace, but not exclusive. Scholarship
tracing the origins of the prosecutorial function in colonial America
73
74
75
76

77

78
79

The Crown Prosecution Service, Private Prosecutions, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to
_r/private_prosecutions/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
Id.
Id.
See Luke Traynor, Integration Not Working Says City Debate Vote, LIVERPOOL ECHO, July 12,
2007, at 15, available at http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/liverpool-news/local-news
/2007/07/12/integration-not-working-says-city-debate-vote-100252-19444008/.
See Press Release, The Crown Prosecution Service, CPS Advise on Stephen Lawrence ReInvestigation (May 5, 2004), http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/120_04 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
By at least one count, roughly “37 percent of non-motoring offences” were privately prosecuted. See STAFFORD, supra note 67, Introduction.
See Richard Gaskins, Changes in the Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut, 25 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 309, 313 (1981) (“[C]rimes against public morality were systematically downgraded . . . while crimes against property were gradually up-graded.”).
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demonstrates that colonial legislatures, borrowing from the Dutch,
80
Until the lateoften established offices for public prosecutors.
nineteenth century, however, private prosecutions dominated the le81
gal landscape.
In her comprehensive history of the American prosecutor, to
which anyone writing in the field owes a significant debt, Professor
Joan Jacoby traces the roots of the American prosecutor to England,
explaining that the colonists largely replicated the legal systems with
82
which they were most familiar. For example, the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, one of the largest settlements in the American colonies,
strove to emulate the English example by adopting the English justice
83
of the peace model. According to George Haskins, “[replicating
English systems in America] was what they were used to . . . it comported well with the leaders’ ideas about the functions of government
84
and law.”
Although the colonists transplanted English law to America, they
adapted it to meet the needs of a geographically sprawling patchwork
of “colonies . . . spread along the Eastern seaboard . . . for almost two
thousand miles with only distant connections to the central govern85
ment in England and with virtually no ties to one another.” And
while the bulk of early colonial settlers may have had English roots,

80

81

82
83

84
85

Connecticut has been cited as “the first colony to appoint public prosecutors.” See JOAN
E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 17 (1980). In 1704, the
Queen’s attorney in Connecticut, the colonial equivalent of the district attorney, was empowered to “prosecute and implead in the lawe all criminall offenders, and to doe all
other things necessary or convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and imorallitie.” 3
CHARLES J. HOADLY, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT: FROM
AUGUST, 1689, TO MAY, 1706, at 468 (1868); see also Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution,
423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 103 (1976) (“In May of 1704, the Connecticut
Assembly passed the law which is generally recognized as creating the first permanent office of public prosecutor on a colony-wide basis . . . .”). Interestingly, the job of the attorney general in New Hampshire, first appointed in 1683, was to present criminal indictments before the grand jury. See ELWIN L. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
1640–1700, at 60 (1959).
See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 571–72; see also Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a
Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071–
72 (1990) (describing original understanding of the role of prosecutors).
See generally JACOBY, supra note 80.
See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr.
2005, at 34, 38, available at http://www.mcaa-mn.org/docs/2005/AmericanProsecutor
HistoricalContext52705.pdf (noting “the Massachusetts Bay Colony modeled its court system after the rural British justice of the peace courts”).
GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN
TRADITION AND DESIGN 177 (1960).
JACOBY, supra note 80, at 11. See also JOHN BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 59
(1963).
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immigrants from other cultures brought with them their own ideas
86
with respect to government’s role in enforcing criminal law. Professor John Blum, in discussing the settlers’ diverse ancestry and who
that ancestory affected their legal forms, has noted:
[N]one of their institutions [were] quite like its English counterpart; the
heritage of English ideas that went with the institutions was so rich and
varied that Americans were able to select and develop those that best
suited their situation and forget others that meanwhile were growing
87
prominent in the mother country.

Similarly, Professor Jacoby has explained that in the colonies of New
York and New Jersey, which enjoyed a preponderance of colonists
from Holland, “the British common law methods of prosecution were
altered early because of the influence of Dutch law and the duties of
88
a Dutch judicial officer, the schout.” Among the duties exercised by
the schout was that of “[the] present[ment of] criminal charges
89
against alleged criminals.” As described by Professor Jacoby, the
schout acted as a sort of one-man criminal justice system: collecting
evidence, presenting it before a court, contacting witnesses, and noti90
fying the accused of the charges leveled against him.
The confluence of the colonists’ varied legal traditions and the
growing need to maintain order in a burgeoning society thus drove
modifications to the English system and enabled the colonists to craft
a prosecutorial system that best served their local interests. The statutory creation of a public prosecutor in certain colonies was one such
innovation. Professor Jack Kress has observed that the public prosecutor appears to be
[A] distinctive and uniquely American contribution . . . . Whereas Americans typically describe their legal system as based upon the English common law . . . the public prosecutor is a figure virtually unknown to the
91
English system, which is primarily one of private prosecution to this day.

Nevertheless, Connecticut’s Constitution appears to be the only
92
such charter to refer to a local prosecutor, which may be attributed
to that one-time colony’s establishment of a system of public prosecu93
tors by 1704. Professor Jacoby’s work identifies few mentions of public prosecutors in the time period immediately after the federal Con86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 38.
BLUM ET AL., supra note 85, at 59.
JACOBY, supra note 80, at 13 (citing Van Alstyne, supra note 26, at 125).
Id. at 14.
See id. (listing the duties of the justices of the peace).
Jack M. Kress, supra note 80, at 100.
See JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22; see also Sidman, supra note 26, at 763 (exploring the history of private prosecutions).
Id. at 10.
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94

stitution’s ratification, noting that “[o]nly five of these first thirteen
95
constitutions . . . mention the office of the Attorney General.” However, those charters, as was common for the day, relegated that office
to one primarily of legal advisor, not prosecutor. According to Professor Jacoby, and buttressed by a review of the relevant documents,
of the state constitutions adopted at that time, only Connecticut and
96
New York appear to refer to the office of the public prosecutor.
Without a practice of establishing an office for the prosecution of
crimes, it is no surprise then that the colonists and early Americans
imported from England the practice of private prosecutions of crimi97
nal offenses. The absence of police forces and public prosecutors
necessitated such a practice:
[The crime victim] served as policeman and prosecutor who, if he chose
to apprehend an offender and initiate a prosecution, did so directly and
at his own expense. He did not have to rely on other government agencies. On the contrary, he could not rely on them even if he had wanted
to because they either did not exist or did not perform the function he
98
sought.

The enterprising colonists, left to their own devices, established
legal forums to resolve disputes and provide a peaceable means of
seeking restitution. And, it appears, that without statutorily established public prosecutors, privately-retained prosecutors managed the
99
majority of criminal enforcement actions.
For crimes against property, the victims, it appears, tended to
100
Such an arrangement
bring private prosecutions to seek redress.
101
makes perfect sense —especially if the threat of criminal punishment forced settlement or if the defendant had little ability to satisfy

94
95

96

97
98
99
100
101

See id. at 273.
Id. at 22. The constitutions of Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia include the office of attorney general in the judicial article. Id. The attorney general in New Hampshire, first appointed in 1683, was to present criminal indictments before the grand jury. See PAGE, supra note 80, at 60.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII; JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22; Jacoby, supra note 83, at 34.
Secondary references to public prosecutors, as Professor Jacoby notes, are equally rare.
For example, an 1816 manual for bar members describing New York government covers
twenty-one officers without mentioning public prosecutors. See generally JOHN TAPPEN,
THE COUNTY AND TOWN OFFICER (1816).
See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 37–38.
William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the
Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649 (1976) (footnote omitted).
See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 571–72 (discussing the dominance of private prosecutions
in the colonies).
See Jacoby, supra note 83, at 37.
See Gaskins, supra note 79, at 313–15 (explaining why property crimes were handled in
civil proceedings).
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a civil judgment. Indeed, contemporary scholarship suggests that the
number of tort cases dwarfed those of criminal cases in colonial
102
If a civil suit proved impractical, the victim of a crime
America.
would need some sort of ability to seek recompense to repair the
harm done. Under such an arrangement, the state would have little
need to involve itself, except to provide its citizens with a forum to
103
settle disputes in a court of law rather than by force of arms.
Thus, ministerial functionaries, such as justices of the peace or aldermen, used informal procedures to deal with privately initiated
104
prosecutions. Private litigants retained control over their cases and
could choose to settle even in circumstances in which a grand jury
105
might have returned an indictment.
If there is a dearth of references to private prosecutions in colonial America, it probably is a
product of the inadequate record keeping of the times, as well as the
fact that a case settled after the threat of prosecution might never
have been recorded and would be lost to modern researchers.
And for the most part, early attorneys general and district attor106
neys functioned more as legal advisors than actual prosecutors. For
example, attorneys general provided legal advice to other government functionaries and rendered legal opinions interpreting statutes,
107
state contracts, or judicial opinions. District prosecutors, instead of
performing the functions we commonly think of today, performed
the administrative tasks of a quasi-judicial official or served the courts,

102

103

104

105

106
107

See generally Goldstein, supra note 71, at 1286. In fact, the number of so-called public
crimes remained fairly small during this time—perhaps because evolving societies concerned with survival had other, more pressing issues on which to focus. For a discussion
along these lines, see William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1967).
See, e.g., Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in SELECT CASES OF THE
MAYOR’S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674–1784, at 57–59 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935)
(describing how in 1783, a victim used private prosecution for trespass to vindicate an anti-Tory state policy “in derogation of the sixth article of the treaty of peace”).
See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK 341, 347–50, 366–67, 379–82 (1944) (describing relatively informal procedures
used in private prosecutions); see also Steinberg, supra note 10, at 572–73 (highlighting
the importance of alderman and justices of the peace to the criminal justice system and
describing the types of offenses they handled).
See, e.g., Donna J. Spindel, The Administration of Criminal Justice in North Carolina, 1720–
1740, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 141, 161 (1981) (suggesting that many prosecutions were
dismissed when a party failed to appear); Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574 (arguing that,
in Pennsylvania, private control over the settlement of cases persisted into nineteenth
century).
See Dangel, supra note 81, at 1073 (“First, colonial attorneys general and district attorneys
performed non-prosecutorial tasks . . . .”).
See id.
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which often were responsible for their appointment.
While select
jurisdictions empowered public prosecutors to quash privately initi109
110
ated suits, few permitted them to initiate criminal cases.
Following the Constitution’s ratification in 1789, state constitutions slowly began to acknowledge offices of public prosecution, but
without ending the practice of private prosecution where it had pre111
Interestingly, district attorneys, who actively manviously existed.
aged prosecutions, tended to be elected while attorneys general, who
served exclusively as legal advisors to the government, often re112
mained appointed officials.
Why this dichotomy persisted is un113
clear. One might argue, however, that their difference in function
dictated that attorneys general ought to be appointed by those whom
they advised, while public prosecutors, who might be counted on to
represent the interests of a particular victim as well as the state, were
best elected directly by the people. Similarly, concerns about the
centralization of prosecutorial authority may have fueled popularly
elected prosecutors who operate with a significant degree of independence from other governmental departments. A desire to ensure
that public prosecutors could be held directly accountable by the
people would thus conform to the idea of a carefully checked and balanced government, even if a prosecutor created to represent the in108

109

110
111

112

113

The public prosecutor often acted as a judicial clerk and set the stage for the private
prosecutor and defendant to present their case before the court. See JACOBY, supra note
80, at 23 (stating that in the nineteenth century district attorneys were minor court figures and served primarily judicial, not executive, roles); see also Steinberg, supra note 10,
at 577 (describing a public prosecutor’s duties as including organizing the court’s calendar).
See People v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Ill. App. 263, 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1882)
(per curiam) (“He may commence public prosecutions, in his official capacity by information and he may discontinue them when, in his judgment, the ends of justice are satisfied.”).
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 71, at 1286 (“[L]ike its English ancestor, [America] places extraordinary emphasis on local autonomy and charging discretion.”).
See, e.g., MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 25 (“There shall be an attorney general . . . .”).
Mississippi in 1817 and Louisiana in 1812 separated the prosecuting attorney from the attorney general, who served as advisor to the executive. See LA. CONST. of 1812, art. IV, § 7
(“There shall be an attorney general for the state, and as many other prosecuting attorneys for the state as may be hereafter found necessary.”); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. V,
§ 14 (“There shall be an attorney general for the State, and as many district attornies as
the general assembly may deem necessary . . . .”).
States distinguished the prosecutor from the attorney general, who was a legal advisor to
the executive, and the sheriff, who embodied the executive function of law enforcement.
See JACOBY, supra note 80, at 22–25 (comparing the roles of attorneys general and sheriffs).
See generally Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985) (providing the Supreme Court of Virginia’s discussion of the historical development of the private prosecutor).
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terests of justice as opposed to the popular will might better be insulated from politics in the same way in which judges are. But, if the
underlying point of electing public prosecutors was to ensure their
ties to the community, then they were probably not thought of either
as being at odds with privately managed prosecutions or even as being a necessity, given the availability of such privately managed prosecutions. As Professor Jacoby acknowledges, the public prosecutor was
“for the first half-century at least . . . . clearly a minor actor in the
114
court’s structure.”
115
Commonwealth v. Williams is among the earliest cases to criticize
the practice of private prosecution. In Williams, the defendants were
charged with burglarizing a bank in Charlestown, Massachusetts. At
trial, the court granted the District Attorney’s motion to have a private attorney aid in prosecuting the case. The defendants were convicted. On appeal, the defendants argued that the conviction should
be overturned because the private attorney was permitted to aid in
116
the prosecution.
The Court nevertheless upheld the conviction,
explaining that with the permission of the court, private counsel may
117
aid a public prosecutor in a case.
The Court noted that while public prosecutors would be expected to shoulder the primary duty in
arguing a criminal case to a jury, exceptions may occur in particular
cases with the court’s permission. The Court thus concluded that it
lay within the judge’s discretion to grant the district attorney’s request for assistance and, in turn, implicitly upheld the principle that
118
privately-managed prosecutions were legitimate.
One is left curious as to why states moved to adopt public prosecution schemes. An argument can be made for the ability of the state to
collect fines assessed against convicted criminals when the prosecutor
is a government agent. Indeed, early English history suggests that the
monarch was more interested in obtaining a “cut” from the criminal
proceeds—predictable rent-seeking behavior—than in ensuring the
119
victim was adequately recompensed.
Moreover, even in circum-

114
115
116
117
118

119

JACOBY, supra note 80, at 23.
56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 582 (1849) (finding the indictments for the offense sufficient and
overruling the defense’s motion).
Id. at 584 (stating that the court had permitted a private attorney to aid in the prosecution and that he had opened the case to the jury and examined several witnesses).
Id. at 585.
See id. (“While we deem it our duty to say, that such additional counsel is not, under ordinary circumstances, to be permitted, yet, when sanctioned by the court . . . it will not furnish any sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict.”).
See Linda B. Deutschmann & Aaron Young, Crime and Delinquency, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS 69,
70 (Norman A. Dolch et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (“In early England, crimes were violations
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stances in which no fine is sought, the incarceration of the offender
both provides “justice” to the victim as well as a benefit to society by
removing from the community—at least in some circumstances—a
threat to the social order. But, since neither incarceration nor the
death penalty were common punishments in colonial America (death
sentences were sometimes imposed, but seldom carried out), the reasons private prosecutions were rejected in favor of their public counterparts remain unclear.
Professor Allen Steinberg provides an interesting explanation for
120
the decline of private prosecutions in early Pennsylvania. Professor
Steinberg analyzed Pennsylvania criminal justice data to provide a
window into the history of criminal prosecution in that state. He
concluded that, contrary to some assertions, “the fee system [by
which private prosecutions were maintained] did not prevent anyone
121
In fact,
from participating in this criminal justice relationship.”
Steinberg unearthed evidence that “[g]rand jurors, judges, and journalists frequently commented on the ease with which the poorest Philadelphians, and those otherwise excluded from public life, made use
122
of this system.” Steinberg asserts that the system of private prosecution declined “not because it ceased to be effective for the citizens using it, but because it was an ineffective means of law enforcement in
123
the matter of breaches of the public order.” Philadelphia’s increasing concern with maintaining public order, especially in circumstances in which no victim might be found, led to the creation of a
public police force. The public police force, in turn, “initiat[ed]
more criminal prosecutions than ever before” and did so “without a
124
private complainant.”
The blossoming of public prosecutions coupled with “increased
dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of aldermen and grand jurors to
125
restrain excessive private prosecution” led Pennsylvania, at least, to
undertake efforts to limit the scope of private prosecutions. According to Professor Steinberg, this was done, in no small part, by eliminating the office of aldermen, a low-level ministerial position largely

120
121
122
123
124
125

of the ‘King’s Peace.’ Fines were paid to the king, who made a profit from providing justice.” (citation omitted)).
See Steinberg, supra note 10; cf. Christopher Tomlins, In This Issue, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. xv
(2001) (noting that “most crimes in premodern societies were prosecuted privately”).
Steinberg, supra note 10, at 574.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 581.
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responsible for adjudicating privately initiated prosecutions.
The
rise of the public police force, which brought a corresponding increase in the number of criminal prosecutions, and the restructuring
of the judicial system with an increasing reliance upon judges and an
independent judiciary, effectively squeezed out private prosecutions
127
in Pennsylvania.
C. The Rapid Decline of Private Criminal Law Enforcement in the United
States
By the turn of the twentieth century, the use of private prosecutors appears largely to have faded from the scene. In his Article, The
Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, Judge Walter M. Pickett summed up
the status of criminal prosecution in the following words:
In all criminal cases in Connecticut, ‘the state’ is the prosecutor. The
offenses are aginst [sic] ‘the state.’ The victim of the offense is not a
‘party’ to the prosecution nor does he occupy any relation to it other
than that of a ‘witness,’ an interested witness mayhap but none the less
only a witness.
It is not necessary that the injured party make complaint, nor is he
required to give bond to prosecute; he is in no sense a ‘relator.’ He cannot in any way control the prosecution and whether reluctant or no, he
can be compelled like any other witness to appear and testify.
As expressed in the case of Malley v. Lane[,] . . . ‘[t]he peace is that
state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness
128
of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.’

Malley, decided in 1921 when a new “wave of democratization” was
129
sweeping the country, illustrates the trend towards subordinating
the interests of the victim to those of society. The individual’s loss in
such a scheme is not explicitly stated as such; rather, the cost of the
offense to society is the dominant consideration. Rather than accepting Adam Smith’s insight in which society as a whole benefits when
130
individuals pursue their own rightly understood interests, it can be

126
127

128

129
130

Id. at 582.
Professor Steinberg notes that “[a]ny attempt to generalize about the history of American
criminal prosecution is fraught with danger.” Id. at 583. Nevertheless, he makes a strong
case for doing precisely that: namely, using the Pennsylvania experience as a means of
understanding the broader decline of private prosecutions in the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries.
Walter M. Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 348, 356–57 (1926) (quoting Malley v. Lane, 115 A. 674, 676 (Conn.
1921)); cf. JACOBY, supra note 80, at 11.
See generally Renske Doorenspleet, Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization, 52 WORLD
POL. 384 (2000) (identifying a period of democratization between 1826 and 1926).
See generally SMITH, supra note 14, at 477.
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argued that democratic ideals necessitated the demise of the private
prosecutor. Professor Jacoby offered a similar insight: “Private prosecution [became] inconsistent with the American concept of democratic process and[, thus,] had a short life span in the American colo131
nies.”
The states’ decision to eschew privately managed prosecutions in
favor of public ones might not have been purely an evolution in democratic thinking and democratic institutions. Douglas Campbell
argues that private prosecutions (at least in England) constituted a
132
system “by the rich and for the rich” destined to fail in a democracy.
“Bought” justice could never equate to public justice. Professor Jacoby has echoed this concern, positing that: “[t]he rejection of the
general notion of a privileged class within society also resulted in the
rejection of ideas and forms that tended to protect that privilege. In
colonial America, public prosecution was an available and progressive
133
remedy for a population dedicated to a more democratic society.”
Certainly, this is not simply an indictment leveled at colonial America
or early England. Recent news reports condemn the cost of private
prosecutions but note that they are necessary to buttress an “ineffec134
tive[]” criminal justice system. And yet, while there is no doubt an
advantage to be gained by having the state initiate and maintain a
prosecution, what benefit is accrued to the victim (other than a general feeling that someone is doing something)? The fine, after all,
goes to the state. Mandatory victim restitution is only a fairly recent
135
If the goal is general deterrence, does it matter who
innovation.
conducts the prosecution? While it is often argued that a public
prosecutor will be more fair than her private counterpart because of
her obligation to “justice,” not merely to a self-interested client, is
that necessarily so?
Presumably, the state’s decision to monopolize criminal prosecutions is in part incentivized by the fact that fines levied against the
convict will go to the state. Ultimately, whatever the causes—the democratic impulse, economic factors, or the mounting complexity of
the law—privately initiated prosecutions played less and less of a role
as the nation’s system of criminal prosecution evolved.

131
132
133
134
135

JACOBY, supra note 80, at 10.
2 DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND, AND AMERICA 444 (1892).
JACOBY, supra note 80, at 17.
See Protection—What Protection?, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh), April 21, 2007, at 25.
See FINES AND RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURTS 7 (Maxwell R. Silverstein ed., 2003)
(“[M]andatory restitution as part of a federal criminal sentence is a relatively recent
idea.”).
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Yet, it is crucial to bear in mind the criminal law’s justification of
general deterrence. That said, even with the advantages of public
prosecution, it arguably does not matter who conducts the prosecution. Nor is it clear than a public prosecutor will act more fairly than
a private counterpart seeking personal justice for his client. While
the public prosecutor may have an obligation to seek impartial justice
for the state, he or she is not always immune from local or national
political pressures in how to conduct the office. It is not necessarily
so that a public prosecutor will be more fair than her private counterpart because of her obligation to “justice,” rather than a victim
seeking personal justice, or “vengeance.” And conversely, while there
are admittedly advantages to be gained from the state initiating and
carrying out prosecutions, little benefit typically, other than a sense
that something is being done, accrues to the victim in a public prosecution system.
II. CONTEMPORARY PRIVATE PROSECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
136

Although several states continue to allow private prosecutions,
most jurisdictions have either disallowed privately managed prosecutions completely, or severely limited the role a private prosecutor may
137
play. The Texas case discussed at the beginning of this Article may
represent something of an anomally. Iowa and North Dakota, for example, have laws prohibiting a private attorney from accepting a fee
138
for prosecuting a criminal case.
Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and Nebraska have laws that prevent a former prosecutor
from acting as private counsel in a subsequent civil case that relies on
the same factual scenario as he or she had previously prosecuted as a

136

137

138

See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 152 (2004) (pointing out that courts will require the appointment of a disinterested attorney even though interested parties may be appointed to
assist); see also Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Disqualification or Recusal of Prosecuting Attorney Because of Relationship with Alleged Victim or Victim’s Family, 12 A.L.R. 5TH 909, 924
(1993) (describing an Ohio case where a court concluded that the disqualification of a
special prosecutor employed by the victim was not required).
David E. Rigney, Annotation, Participation of Private Counsel for Beneficiary of Court Order
Allegedly Violated by Defendant, in Prosecution of Federal Criminal Contempt Proceeding, 96 A.L.R.
FED. 519, 520 (1990) (observing that “private counsel may participate with government or
disinterested court-appointed counsel . . . so long as the private attorney does not effectively control the proceeding”).
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1974) (discussing statute prohibiting private attorney from accepting fees for private prosecution of a criminal case); State
v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631, 635 (N.D. 1895) (holding that statute forbidding lawyer from accepting fees for private prosecution of a criminal case did not apply to privately retained
special counsel).

684

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:3

139

criminal matter.
Likewise, in Colorado, the Supreme Court has
held that private prosecutions are themselves prejudicial, at least
when those prosecutions are factually related to subsequent civil pro140
ceedings.
Nevertheless, even while diminished in scope, private prosecutions continue to play a role in the criminal justice system. Private
prosecutions often occur as the result of a court seeking enforcement
of a judicial order, when private counsel posesses specialized knowledge about a case, or when a public prosecutor’s office is conflicted
out of a case. I will briefly discuss common instances of private prosecution in the sections that follow.
A. The Private Prosecution of Criminal Contempt Citations
The majority of the modern-day cases involving privately managed
prosecutions deal with the issue of whether a private attorney may
lawfully prosecute a contempt citation after an adverse party’s alleged
violation of a court order. Extant cases posit three different methods
by which a private attorney may prosecute criminal contempt. First,
the court may, sua sponte, appoint a private prosecutor; second, the
plaintiff may retain private counsel with the court’s consent; or finally, the public prosecutor may seek the assistance of private counsel

139

140

See People v. Kidd, 81 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ill. 1948) (“The state’s attorney shall . . . not be
retained or employed, except for the public, in a civil case depending upon the same
state of facts on which a criminal prosecution shall depend.”); Commonwealth v. Tabor,
384 N.E.2d 190, 195–96 (Mass. 1978) (“[N]o prosecuting officer shall . . . be concerned as
counsel or attorney for either party in a civil action depending upon the same facts involved in such prosecution or business.” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 30 (1978)));
People v. Hillhouse, 45 N.W. 484, 486 (Mich. 1890) (“The statute is positive and peremptory that the attorney shall not be permitted to prosecute, or aid in prosecuting, any person for an alleged criminal offense, where he is engaged or interested in any civil suit or
proceeding depending upon the same state of facts, against such person, direcly or indirectly.”); Fitzgerald v. State, 110 N.W. 676, 677 (Neb. 1907) (“No prosecuting attorney
shall . . . be concerned as an attorney or counsel for either party, other than for the state
or county, in any civil action depending upon the same state of facts upon which any
criminal prosecution, commenced or prosecuted, shall depend.”). Relying on a statute
prohibiting public prosecutors from receiving compensation from crime victims, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court initially struck down private prosecution in 1855 in the
case of Commonwealth v. Gibbs. See 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146, 148 (1855) (“[T]he appointment was irregular in point of law.”). That court has since held that “a private citizen has
no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another.” Taylor v. Newton Div. of
Dist. Court Dept., 622 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Mass. 1993).
See People v. Jiminez, 528 P.2d 913, 915–16 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (prohibiting prosecutor from representing party in divorce proceeding arising from same facts that gave rise
to the criminal case).
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to undertake the action. Each of these situations will be discussed in
turn.
1. Trial Court Appointment
In circumstances in which the complainant alleges that the adverse party has violated a court order, the trial court may respond by
selecting a prosecutor to undertake enforcement of the contempt action. In Rogowicz v. O’Connell, for example, the plaintiff alleged that
141
the defendant violated the court’s protective order. The court had
issued the order after the plaintiff filed a domestic violence peti142
tion, but the county prosecutor thought the matter was “civil in na143
The trial court exercised its auture” and declined to prosecute.
thority to appoint private counsel sua sponte and selected the
director of New Hampshire’s Legal Assistance Domestic Violence
144
Project to prosecute. The respondent challenged the court’s deci145
sion to appoint a private prosecutor. Although the New Hampshire
Supreme Court agreed that the trial court enjoyed the power to appoint private counsel to enforce its order, it held that the court erred
in the appointment of the Project’s attorney because counsel would
146
personally benefit from the court order.
Federal district courts have also had occasion to appoint private
prosecutors to enforce contempt citations. The district court in United States v. Vlahos, for example, appointed a private prosecutor in a
147
There, the contempt proceeding
criminal contempt proceeding.
arose from the alleged violation of a court order issued in a civil case
brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against the re148
spondent. Initially, the court refused to allow the FTC itself to pros149
Other government prosecutors were
ecute the alleged contempt.
sought out, but the court similarly disqualified those government at-

141
142
143
144

145
146
147

148
149

786 A.2d 841, 842 (N.H. 2001).
Id.
Id.
See id. (“The record is not clear on how [the director of New Hampshire’s Legal Assistance Domestic Violence Project] assumed the role of prosecutor, but a pleading she
filed alleges that the family division requested her appearance.”).
Id.
Id. at 843, 845.
No. 93 CR 360, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11781, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1993) (“[T]his court
deemed its request that the appropriate prosecutorial authority handle this matter to
have been ‘constructively denied,’ and therefore appointed a private attorney to handle
this matter.”).
Id.
Id.
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torneys because of their connection to the FTC.
As a result, the
court found that its request for appropriate prosecutorial authority
was “constructively denied” and instead appointed a private attorney
151
to prosecute. The court relied on its inherent authority to ensure
152
enforcement of its orders.
2. Plaintiff Initiated Appointment of Private Counsel
While courts may choose to appoint a private prosecutor sua
sponte, a somewhat more common scenario is for the plaintiff involved in the underlying civil litigation to request appointment of
private counsel to prosecute the contempt action.
Where the contempt action arises from an underlying civil case,
plaintiffs will often seek to use the private attorney who litigated the
civil cause. For instance, in Wilson v. Wilson, the respondent in the
underlying civil case tried to use the same attorney from a divorce
proceeding to prosecute two contempt actions arising from the civil
153
Although the trial court approved, the Court of Appeals of
trial.
Tennessee overruled this appointment, apparently because of the
154
concern that counsel had a stake in the underlying cause. In Woodside v. Woodside, however, the plaintiff prosecuted a criminal contempt charge of failing to pay court-ordered child support by using
155
her attorney from the divorce proceedings. Unlike the outcome in
Wilson, however, in this case, the Court of Appeals in Tennessee af156
firmed the appointment.
Similarly, in Green v. Green, the plaintiff used her personal attorney
from the underlying civil action to prosecute her former husband for
contempt after he violated a civil protection order issued by the
157
court. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the ap150
151
152

153

154
155

156
157

Id.
Id.
See id. at *2–3 (“[T]he U.S. Attorney’s Office argues that the court’s power to appoint a
private attorney is an inherent power of self-protection that should be used only as a last
resort. This court agrees wholeheartedly . . . .”).
No. 01A01-9704-CV-00152, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 199, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20,
1998) (describing plaintiff’s motions to disqualify private counsel because of involvement
in divorce proceeding).
See id. at *2–3 (explaining that this type of appointment is contrary to judicial and attorney ethical standards).
No. 01-A-01-9503-PB-00121, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 694, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
1995) (describing ex-husband’s notice of appeal regarding his ex-wife’s retention of private counsel for the contempt prosecution).
Id. at *14.
642 A.2d 1275, 1276 (D.C. 1994) (“[T]he wife’s attorneys acted as the prosecuting attorneys during the intrafamily contempt proceedings . . . .”).
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pointment, explaining that the appointment would expedite the in158
trafamily proceeding, which was a goal of the family justice system.
Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers International, Inc. is another example of a situation in which the plaintiff sought to use the attorneys
159
In
from the civil action to prosecute a criminal contempt action.
the underlying action, the plaintiff had filed a suit alleging that the
160
defendant was infringing on registered trademarks, and the trial
court issued a preliminary injunction order—it was this order that the
161
plaintiffs claimed had been violated.
The plaintiffs, therefore, requested that their own attorney in the civil action be appointed to
162
The trial court allowed this approsecute the contempt charges.
pointment, along with lawyers from two other private law firms, who
163
would also act as co-counsel for the plaintiffs. During the trial, notably, only the privately hired attorneys were present—no one from
164
the U.S. Attorney’s Office appeared.
The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the appointment, finding that it was a conflict of interest to have counsel for an interested party (that is, interested in
165
the underlying civil action) exercise full control of the proceedings.
It is important to note here, however, that the court did not quibble
with the fact that private attorneys had been appointed, but merely
took issue with the government attorneys’ failure to supervise the
case. Presumably, had the U.S. Attorney’s Office been more in control of the prosecution, it would have survived scrutiny.
In re Sasson Jeans, Inc. demonstrates a more problematic situation
in which a plaintiff, who was designated as the trustee of the defendant debtor company’s assets, sought to prosecute the contempt ac166
tion himself. The Department of Justice appointed the plaintiff to
167
As the bankserve as a “fiduciary vested with [the] public trust.”
ruptcy trustee, the plaintiff was supervised by the Attorney General.
He initiated the contempt proceedings after the defendant failed to

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 1276, 1279–80.
760 F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Polo also requested that its attorneys be appointed to
prosecute the criminal contempt charges.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704.
104 B.R. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the trustee’s prosecution of the alleged
contempt charges violated the holding in a U.S. Supreme Court case).
Id. at 604 (quoting In re Sasson Jeans, Inc., 83 B.R. 206, 217 n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
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turn over the assets. The bankruptcy court had allowed the trustee
to bring the action because of his role as a government representative; but without any sort of detailed analysis, the district court reversed the conviction because of the potential for a conflict of inter169
est. The court did not elaborate on this concern, however.
Finally, in In re Peak, for example, the plaintiff brought a contempt
action after the defendant violated a permanent injunction to refrain
170
from illegal drug use.
During a status hearing, the district court
expressed its concern that no prosecutor had been designated to en171
force violation of the injunction. The court therefore encouraged
the plaintiff to seek counsel from the U.S. Attorney’s Office or to ob172
tain help from a local legal clinic.
Several months later, attorneys
173
from a private firm entered an appearance for the plaintiff, which
174
On review, however, the D.C. Court of
the trial court approved.
Appeals overruled the appointment because the private counsel
175
could personally benefit from the proceeding.
In general, it is hard to understand why, intrinsically, it would be
problematic for counsel to benefit from the prosecution. While it is
true that ethical canons generally prohibit lawyers from taking crimi176
nal cases on the basis of a contingency fee, defense counsel are routinely paid for their efforts. Provided that the fee paid to private
counsel is not based upon whether or not the prosecution is successful and other ethical requirements are followed, there should be no
other impediment to private counsel managing the prosecution. I
suspect the court’s primary concern was that a private prosecution initiated by counsel who stands to benefit in the underlying civil proceeding “taints” the prosecution.
3. Private Counsel as an Adjunct to the Public Prosecutor
Another common situation in which private prosecutions may
arise occur in cases in which the private attorney simply collaborates
with the government in bringing the prosecution. In United States v.

168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

See id. at 602 (“[The bankruptcy judge] found Guez to have willfully violated his orders . . . directing that assets of the debtor company be turned over to the trustee.”).
Id. at 609.
See In re Francine Peak, 759 A.2d 612, 613 (D.C. 2000).
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 620.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2002).
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Smith, for example, a privately appointed attorney acted as co-counsel
177
The defendant was charged with
to the government’s attorney.
criminal contempt for failing to appear in court for a civil proceeding
178
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The
district court first appointed the private firm to represent the SEC in
civil actions and to prosecute the criminal contempt citation. However, by this time, the Supreme Court had decided Young v. United
179
States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., so the firm filed a motion to vacate the
180
The district court obliged and appointed lawyers
appointment.
from the firm as “Special Assistant[s] to the United States Attor181
ney.” Despite their designation as “Special Assistants,” the firm lawyers did the bulk of the work during trial, including the examination
182
of the witnesses and presentation of evidence.
Due to the lack of
involvement by the government’s office, however, the court of ap183
peals reversed the conviction.
B. Examining Private Prosecutions Maintained Under State Law
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
each allow private counsel to participate in a criminal prosecution in
184
some way. Although a comprehensive examination of each of those
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

No. 87-1274, 1991 WL 113192, at *1 (9th Cir. June 24, 1991).
Id.
481 U.S. 787, 802 (1987) (disapproving of the appointment of private counsel for an interested party to prosecute criminal contempt).
Smith, 1991 WL 113192, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5.
See, e.g., N.J. R. CT. 7:4-4(b) (1995) (current version located at N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b)); Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (“[A] special prosecutor’s employment by the victim to represent him in a civil action arising out of the same transaction as the criminal proceeding does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial” and “the
fact that the attorney was employed by those interested in the prosecution is wholly immaterial.” (quoting Brooks v. State, 228 So. 2d 24, 28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1969))); Allen v.
State, 257 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that it is not improper for a special
prosecutor to also represent the victim in a civil suit arising from the same underlying circumstances); Shuttleworth v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1210, 1217–18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (providing that a prosecutor’s prior representation of the defendant’s wife in a couple’s divorce proceeding did not disqualify him in a criminal action for non-support); State v.
Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (holding that no constitutional or statutory provisions prevent private prosecutors from assisting in criminal prosecutions); Commonwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. 1944) (holding that the trial court has discretion to permit private prosecution); Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 899–902 (Tenn.
1998) (holding that there is no automatic disqualification for private counsel representing party in divorce proceeding and violation of criminal contempt action against oppos-
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individual state rules is beyond the scope of this Article, I will consider several other circumstances in which states, subject to various
limitations, permit privately-managed prosecutions.
1. The New Jersey Court Rule
Prior to a 2007 amendment to the New Jersey Rules of Court, Rule
7:4-4(b) permitted any attorney to appear on behalf of any complaining witness and prosecute the action if the Attorney General or local
185
prosecutor did not appear in court on behalf of the state. Thus, in
State v. Bazin, the union representative for a postal worker brought
actions for harassment and simple assault against a U.S. Postal Service
186
inspector. After the plaintiff filed the complaint with the Hamilton
Township Municipal Court, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, representing
the defendant, filed a motion to have the matter removed to federal
187
court.
The Hamilton Township prosecutor, the Mercer County
Prosecutor, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s office subse188
quently all refused to prosecute the matter.
In response to those
refusals, the plaintiff’s union retained the services of a private firm to
189
The
prosecute the action on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
court allowed the appointment.
In State v. Kinder, the court allowed the private prosecution of a
simple assault case after the Municipal Prosecutor declined to bring
190
the action.
His refusal was not premised on any notion that the
prosecution was not in the public interest; rather, his refusal was
based on the belief that the prosecutor’s authority was limited to
courts within the jurisdiction of the City of New Brunswick, while the
191
matter at bar was in federal court.
New Jersey courts have also authorized private prosecutions in
which the private attorney possessed special expertise. In State v. Har-

185
186
187
188
189
190
191

ing party); State v. Ward, 17 A. 483, 485 (Vt. 1889) (holding that the trial court has discretion to permit private prosecution); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25–26
(Va. 1985) (describing history of private prosecutions); State v. King, 396 S.E.2d 402, 411
(W. Va. 1990) (allowing a private attorney to prosecute a criminal case while serving as
the guardian ad litem of the alleged victim); Bird v. State, 45 N.W. 1126, 1126–27 (Wis.
1890) (permitting a private prosecutor’s appointment as long as he had renounced previous employment by the alleged victim’s father).
N.J. R. CT. 7:4-4(b) (1995) (current version at N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b)).
912 F. Supp. 106, 108–09 (D.N.J. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
701 F. Supp. 486, 487, 492 (D.N.J. 1988).
Id. at 487–88.

Mar. 2010]

PRIVATE VENGEANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD

691

ris, for instance, the court allowed a private attorney to prosecute a
192
criminal trespass case. The private attorney, who had represented a
number of apartment complexes in eviction proceedings, including
the complex where the alleged trespass occurred, offered to prosecute the action. The Municipal Prosecutor consented because the
private attorney was familiar with the facts of the case, had expertise
in handling the legal problems of apartment complexes, and had ex193
perience representing the apartment complex at issue in the past.
The Pemberton Township Municipal Court, however, declined to
194
approve the appointment of private counsel. Nevertheless, the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed the municipal court and allowed
195
the appointment.
The New Jersey Rule was subsequently modified to limit the circumstances in which private prosecutors might be appointed. The
revised rule limited such prosecutions to cases involving so-called
“cross-complaints” and “only if the court has first reviewed the private
prosecutor’s motion to so appear” and was satisfied that “a potential
for conflict exists for the municipal prosecutor due to the nature of
196
Importantly, New
the charges set forth in the cross-complaints.”
Jersey did not eliminate private prosecutors; insteady, the state merely
limited the circumstances under which they could operate.
Even under the former rule which lacked the restrictions the 2007
amendments brought, New Jersey courts had established certain limitations on private prosecutions. If a clear conflict of interest exists,
for example, courts would not allow the private attorney to prosecute.
In State v. Imperiale, the plaintiff tried, without counsel, to prosecute a
197
The Municipal Prosecusimple assault case against his supervisor.
198
tor of the Borough of Eatontown decided not to prosecute.
The
court, however, found too great a conflict of interest in having the
199
It is unclear whether the court
victim himself act as prosecutor.
would have permitted the victim to retain private counsel to undertake the prosecution.
The New Jersey courts have also disallowed private attorney prosecutions if there is a lengthy litigious relationship between the parties
in the action and a resultant conflict of interest, as was the case in
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

620 A.2d 1083, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id. at 1088.
N.J. R. CT. 7:8-7(b).
773 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.N.J. 1991).
Id. at 749.
Id. at 756.
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State v. Storm. In this instance, the plaintiff had requested that the
private attorney representing her in a civil action also serve as prosecutor in a criminal stalking and harassment case. The defendant in
the latter was also the opposing party in the civil case, which was be200
ing tried simultaneously.
According to the court, both actions
merely represented part of the on-going battle between the parties in
201
their “lengthy litigious history.” For these reasons the court found
that there was too much of a conflict of interest for the private attor202
ney to prosecute. In all likelihood, the court was more concerned
about the tortured legal history between the parties and the possibility that the trial would devolve into an opportunity to pursue a personal vendetta rather than about countenancing a private prosecution per se.
2. The New York Experience
Although New York has long permitted privately managed prosecutions, efforts have been made to restrict their use. Professor Peter
Davis has articulated a vigorous defense of the state’s common law
203
private prosecution tradition.
He argues that such prosecutions
serve to vindicate the crime victim’s interests and to support the
204
In People v. Benoit, litigants
state’s efforts in combating crime.
sought to use section 50 of the New York City Criminal Court Act to
authorize a private attorney to prosecute an action after the District
205
Attorney’s office declined. The statute, which authorized a private
citizen to undertake a criminal prosecution after the local district at206
torney’s office has declined to pursue the case, was held unconstitutional by the Criminal Court of the City of New York because the pri207
vate attorney was given too much discretionary authority.
Rather
than forbid the use of private prosecutors altogether, it merely required supervision by the prosecutor’s office.

200
201
202
203

204
205
206
207

State v. Storm, 661 A.2d 790, 792 (N.J. 1995).
Id. at 796.
Id.
See generally Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim’s “Right” to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed
Model Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 329
(1989) (discussing private prosecution as a supplementary model to the public prosecutor’s monopoly on criminal prosecutions).
See id. at 331–41.
575 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991).
See N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT. ACT § 50 (1989).
Benoit, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
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The court in People v. Garfield examined sections 700 and 701 of
208
New York County Law, the latter of which authorizes certain private
209
In this case, the victim wished to
prosecutions in some instances.
prosecute the accused with the charge of leaving the scene of an ac210
cident, and first turned to the local district attorney, who declined
to prosecute. The victim then sought to undertake the prosecution
211
212
himself, without counsel.
However, like State v. Imperiale, the
court found a conflict of interest in allowing the victim, without the
assistance of counsel, to pursue what amounted to a “personal” pros213
ecution. Once again, it is unclear whether the court would have allowed the prosecution to go forward with counsel’s assistance.
3. Current Statutes Allowing Private Prosecutors to Assist Public Officials
The need to leverage private resources as a means of enforcing
the criminal law did not dissipate completely with the modern state’s
monopolization of prosecutorial authority. Indeed, several states authorize private lawyers to serve as deputy prosecutors for a specified
period of time. The court in Fort Emory Cove Boat Owners Ass’n v. Cowett, for example, discusses California “Government Code section
24101,” which allows the district attorney to appoint private attorneys
214
as deputy district attorneys to enforce a state anchorage ordinance.
In this case, the district attorney appointed a private firm that previously served as counsel in a civil case challenging the constitutionality
215
of the ordinance.
The defendant sought an injunction to prevent
the expenditure of public funds to cover the expenses of hiring the
216
private attorneys.
The court allowed the district attorney to make
217
such an appointment in order to discharge his enforcement duties.

208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 700–701 (2004).
See People v. Garfield, 574 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1991) (disqualifying accident
victim from prosecuting criminal complaint against driver who hit him).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 197.
Garfield, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
Fort Emory Cove Boatowners Ass’n v. Cowett, 270 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 531.
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Similarly, Seth v. State examines Delaware’s “Lend-A-Prosecutor”
218
The State Attorney General established this program in
program.
219
cooperation with a private law firm. The law allows a firm to lend
its attorneys to the state justice department for a specified time period, during which they are deputized as “Special Deputy Attorneys
General” to prosecute criminal cases under the Delaware Attorney
220
General’s supervision.
Although they are deputy prosecutors and
devote their full time to the Delaware Justice Department, they con221
The reviewing court in Seth
tinue to be paid by the private firm.
upheld the program, finding its creation to be within the Attorney
222
General’s powers.
This arrangement, of course, looks more like a
“prosecutorial internship” than it does like a formal private prosecution in which the crime victim retains private counsel; nevertheless,
the program illustrates a situation in which a privately paid attorney
may engage in criminal prosecution.
4. Common Law Tradition of Private Prosecutions Maintained
Absent a formal statute or rule, a number of states permit private
prosecutions as a matter of common law. Virginia, for example, has
223
Virginia’s courts, howtraditionally allowed private prosecutions.
224
ever, have restricted their use. In Cantrell v. Commonwealth, a murder trial, the victim’s parents hired a private attorney to assist the
225
public prosecutor.
In point of fact, the private attorney managed
the prosecution and secured the defendant’s conviction. On appeal,
the defendant argued that, because the private attorney had actually
controlled the prosecution, his Virginia due process rights had been
226
violated. Agreeing with the defendant that the private attorney had
indeed managed the prosecution (and not merely assisted), the court
overturned the conviction on the grounds that the attorney was also
representing the victim’s family in a related civil case and, hence, was

218

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

592 A.2d 436, 438 (Del. 1991) (upholding a program allowing attorneys from a private
law firm to work temporarily for the Delaware Department of Justice prosecuting criminal
cases).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25–26 (Va. 1985) (describing history,
rooted in English common law, of allowing private prosecutions).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
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227

serving two clients with different interests.
Thus, there existed a
228
possible conflict between his duties to each. As a result, the court
held that this inherent conflict violated the defendant’s due process
229
rights under the Virginia Constitution.
Although the court reversed the conviction, it should be pointed out that it upheld the use
230
of private prosecutors generally, noting both that the practice was
231
subject to the trial court’s discretion and control, and the question
of whether to abolish or regulate the common law practice of private
232
prosecution was left to the legislature.
New Hampshire follows a similar common law tradition, but its
courts have adopted additional limitations. In State v. Martineau, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the common law practice of
appointing private prosecutors, but limited it to cases where the sen233
tence did not involve a possibility of imprisonment.
After the police decided not to file criminal charges against the defendant, a private citizen filed her own private criminal complaint against the
234
defendant.
The court noted that the New Hampshire legislature
has never prohibited private citizens from initiating criminal proceedings, and therefore the practice is permissible so long as it is not
“repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in the constitu235
tion.”
Because of the potential for violation of the defendant’s
rights and danger to the “sound administration of justice,” the court
held that private prosecution is not permissible for criminal offenses
236
that carry a sentence of imprisonment.
5. Private Counsel and “Special Circumstance” Prosecutions
Often, private prosecutions are sought when the private counsel
may have familiarity with the case or possesses special expertise or
knowledge. Perhaps the most notorious example of a state-hired private prosecutor was the prosecution of legendary former boxing hea-

227
228
229
230

231
232
233
234
235
236

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
See id. at 26 (observing that, although the appearance of a private attorney was improper
in the circumstances of this case, the holding does not disturb the common-law rule generally permitting private attorneys to assist in prosecutions).
Id. at 25.
Id.
808 A.2d 51, 53–54 (N.H. 2002) (finding no authority under common law for private
prosecutions of criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 54.
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vyweight champion Mike Tyson. In Tyson’s 1992 rape prosecution,
the Indianapolis District Attorney’s Office opted to hire a private at237
The attorney was selected not by
torney to lead the prosecution.
the victim, but, rather, the government prosecutor who would have
238
otherwise initiated the case.
239
240
State v. Culbreath and State v. Eldridge are further examples in
which private counsel was retained because of the attorneys’ knowledge of the particular issue. In Culbreath, the Citizens for Community
Values, Inc. (CCV) requested that a particular private attorney work
with two county assistant district attorneys who were involved with the
241
prosecution of obscenity cases. The attorney then served as part of
a criminal investigation team that included in its number several gov242
ernment officials.
Thereafter, the attorney was appointed as a
“Special Assistant District Attorney.” The State Attorney General appointed the attorney to represent the government both in pending
civil litigation against the defendant as well as to pursue possible
243
criminal indictments against him. Throughout this time, however,
244
both the district attorney’s office and CCV paid the attorney’s fees.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee ultimately dismissed the indictments because of the monies paid to the attorney by CCV, a special
interest group. The court was concerned that the members of CCV
were not themselves victims, and CCV was instead an interested party
that could ostensibly create a conflict of interest within the prosecu245
torial office.
Similarly, in State v. Eldridge, the court refused to allow a prosecution to be conducted by a private attorney who represented the victim
246
in the underlying civil action.
The district attorney had requested
that the victim’s attorney be appointed a “special prosecutor[]” to
pursue the murder prosecution because as he was also representing
the victim in a civil matter that had been filed seven months prior
247
and arose from the same incident, the private attorney was conver237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

See Phil Berger, A Drama That Will Rival the Ring When Tyson Faces His Accuser, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1992, at B9.
See id. (“The county has contracted to pay the [private lawyer] . . . .”).
30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).
951 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d at 311.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 309, 312.
951 S.W.2d 775, 776–77 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
See id. at 779 (recounting the timeline of the private attorneys’ involvement in the prosecution and the related civil litigation).
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sant with the facts and had spent considerable time on the case.
On review, however, the court deemed such an appointment to be a
249
conflict of interest and therefore disallowed it.
6. Private Counsel and Conflicts Within the Public Prosecutor’s Office
Potential conflicts of interest, of course, are not limited to private
representation but may arise in circumstances involving public prosecutors as well. A district attorney may request that a private attorney
handle a prosecution if the district attorney herself, or her office, has
250
a conflict of interest. In Schumer v. Holtzman, the district attorney of
Kings County decided to prosecute former Congressman Charles E.
251
Schumer; however, the district attorney was worried about appearing biased due to past political differences and the probability that
her own staff would be called as witnesses in any subsequent prosecu252
tion.
After the Governor refused to supersede her, the district attorney appointed the Dean of Brooklyn Law School as a “Special As253
sistant District Attorney.”
The court, however, subsequently
reversed the appointment because it believed that too much power
had been delegated to a private attorney—not because it was a private
254
prosecution per se.
A similar situation arose in Adkins v. Commonwealth, in which a
grand jury indicted the defendant for murder and the use of a fire255
arm in the commission of murder. Prior to the indictment, the victim’s family hired a private attorney to assist in the investigation and
256
the presentation of the case before the grand jury.
The privately
retained counsel worked with the state and even participated in the
257
While the case was
decision to submit the case to the grand jury.
pending, a new Commonwealth attorney, who had previously represented the defendant’s daughter in another case, was elected to of-

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

255
256
257

Id.
See id. at 781 (discussing conflicts of interests arising from the participation of private
prosecutors).
See Schumer v. Holtzman, 454 N.E.2d 522, 523–24 (N.Y. 1983) (dicussing prohibitions
and powers of district attorney and appointed special assistant district attorneys).
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 525 (“The conduct challenged here is not the appointment of respondent Trager per se, but [the delegation of] power which is normally possessed only by an elected
District Attorney.”).
492 S.E.2d 833, 834 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id.
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258

fice.
When the new attorney filed a motion to recuse herself and
259
requested that a “special prosecutor” be appointed, the circuit
court appointed the victim’s private attorney as the “special prosecu260
tor.”
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the conviction,
however, because in its view, the appointment of the victim’s counsel
261
created a conflict of interest for the private attorney.
The pattern emerging from these decisions is that a conflict of interest is presumed to exist when the prosecuting attorney is compensated by the victim. Legal canons traditionally require that an attor262
Certain courts
ney zealously represent the interests of her client.
have viewed a victim-appointed attorney to have an inherent conflict
263
of interest with a prosecutor’s broader commitment to justice. Oddly, at least post-indictment, it is unclear as to why a privately appointed attorney should have any less commitment to justice than a
public prosecutor. I suspect the reason is that the court may fear that
during the course of the trial, a private prosecutor might make decisions that better reflect the desires of a vengeful victim than an impartial tool of the state. In such circumstances, the concern may be
that the private prosecutor might be more inclined to withhold exculpatory evidence from the defendant, be more obstructionist in
terms of filing motions and conducting cross examinations, and press
for a sentence that satisfies the victim’s sense of fairness rather than
that of society. Victims often feel shut out of the criminal justice
264
process. The government is generally not present to represent the
265
victim’s interests but rather to advance those of society as a whole.
Who then speaks for the victim? This concern for the victim’s interests and the fear that his voice is muted in the criminal justice process
have led to a surge in efforts to ensure that the victim’s rights are tak258
259
260
261
262

263

264

265

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 835–36.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2006) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) (“The duty of the lawyer, both to his client
and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
See People v. Benoit, 575 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (dismissing landlord’s
continued private prosecution against tenant because landlord was no longer a disinterested party having been indicted for same incident); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d
1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (finding inherent conflicts of interest where interested
parties or their attorneys serve as private prosecutors).
See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Parcticipation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 912 (2006) (discussing the lack of participation in the criminal justice system by laymen).
See id.
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en into account. Tim Valentine has noted that “in some jurisdictions
[private prosecutions are] the only way for victims of crime to get justice. You either have a private attorney to assist the state in prosecut266
ing [the defendant] . . . or he just does not get prosecuted.” An interesting twist on this is showcased by Olsen v. Koppy, in which the
complainant had repeatedly asked the Morton County State’s Attorney to initiate prosecutions against his wife and two males for adul267
tery and unlawful cohabitation.
When the State’s Attorney declined, the complainant asked the Morton County District Court to
appoint a private attorney and to deduct the private attorney’s salary
from the State Attorney’s salary. The district court refused to do so,
and the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the decision was
268
within the trial court’s discretion and thus not subject to appeal.
Presumably, the trial court could have appointed private counsel;
however, its decision would similarly not have been subject to review.
C. Federal Law and Private Justice
Private prosecutions have traversed a different path in federal law.
While uncommon, federal law permits private justice under certain
auspices: through the creation of private causes of action in civil suits
and by the establishment of so-called independent counsels. As with
a private criminal prosecution, private causes of action exist to leverage private resources to buttress law enforcement efforts. The independent counsel, on the other hand, exists as a temporary government functionary.
1. Federal Criminal Prosecutions
Little has been written about federal criminal law enforcement in
the time period between American independence and the Constitution’s ratification. Not until the enactment of the Judiciary Act of
1789 do we see the foundation laid for a truly national criminal justice system. That Act, among other things, instituted the office of Attorney General and provided for the appointment of a marshal, one
or more deputy marshals, and a U.S. Attorney for each judicial dis-

266

267
268

Tim Valentine, Private Prosecution, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM:
POLICE, ADJUDICATION, AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 226, 227
(Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992).
593 N.W.2d 762, 763 (N.D. 1999).
See id. at 767 (holding that the order denying an inmate’s request for a private attorney to
initiate prosecutions against his wife and two males for adultery and unlawful cohabitation could not be appealed).
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269

trict.
The Attorney General was empowered “to prosecute and
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States
shall be concerned” and to give advice and render legal opinions
“when required by the President of the United States, or when re270
quested by the heads of any of the [executive] departments.” The
section creating the U.S. Attorneys provided for “a meet person
learned in the law” to act as an attorney for the United States and “to
prosecute in [each] district all delinquents for crimes and offences,
271
cognizable under the authority of the United States.” Federal criminal offenses were thus prosecutable by the presidentially-appointed
and Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys (originally called United States
district attorneys).
Commentators have noted that this national prosecutorial system
was not copied in whole from European models, but instead “drew
from the existing forms that had evolved for local prosecutors in the
272
thirteen original states.”
The Attorney General’s function was primarily one of providing legal advice to the President and his Cabinet.
The prosecutorial authority was lodged within the local district offices. It is unclear whether, following the Constitution’s ratification,
privately managed criminal prosecutions existed for violations of federal criminal law. What is clear, however, is that the scope of federal
criminal law was far more circumscribed than today. Similarly, as no
right of appeal existed in federal criminal cases early in the nation’s
history, we have scant record of the nature of many federal criminal
prosecutions.
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution empowers the President to
273
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Some scholars
have argued, under a unitary executive view of presidential power,
that an inherently executive function cannot be delegated to another
branch of the government, to another governmental authority (such
274
as an independent agency) or, presumably, to a private entity.
However, certainly courts could use their powers to enforce the law
(using their judicial decrees and contempt citations, for example).
In the absence of a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed U.S.
269
270
271
272
273
274

See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 27, 35, 1 Stat. 73, 87, 92 (1789) (providing that a marshal, deputy marshals, and U.S. Attorneys shall be established for U.S. judicial districts).
Id. § 35.
Id.
JACOBY, supra note 80, at 19.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 658–63 (1994) (describing how administrative practice and English practice support the notion that the Executive controls prosecutions).
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Attorney, district courts could, and still can, appoint the U.S. Attor275
And, in fact, if one turns to the practice of the newly indeney.
pendent states, none lodged the authority to bring criminal prosecutions exclusively under their “chief” executives.
Indeed, recent legislative history provides an example of executive
authority residing in government entities other than an administration official. Although today there is no independent counsel statute
in effect, in 1978 Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act,
which permitted the Attorney General to appoint an “independent
counsel,” separate from the Department of Justice, to investigate al276
leged misdeeds by certain government officials. Initially prompted
by the Watergate scandal and concerns that presidentially appointed,
senior Justice Department officials could not be counted on to investigate either its own personnel or other high-level executive branch
officials, the purported intent of the law was to avoid the conflict of
interest that might develop if the Executive Branch was forced to in277
vestigate its own officials.
The independent counsel, as the title
implies, had full prosecutorial authority. After the original law ex278
pired in 1992, President William J. Clinton signed a new independ279
which expanded the laws to
ent counsel statute into law in 1994,
include the investigation and possible prosecution of members of
280
Congress.
In this iteration of the statute, the attorney general requests the appointment of an independent counsel while a panel of
judges makes the actual appointment. The law was allowed to lapse
in 1999 and Congress has not sought to re-enact an independent
281
counsel statute.
Although the Attorney General was directly involved in the process of appointment of an independent counsel, the individual appointed enjoyed virtual independence not only from the Executive
Branch but from the government in general. Not surprisingly, the
statute was challenged for being, among other things, a violation of

275
276
277
278
279
280
281

See 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2003), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502, 120 Stat. 246 (2006)
(current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 546 (West 2007)).
28 U.S.C. §§ 591–598 (1982).
S. Rep. No. 95-273, at 2–3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4376, 4377–78.
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 701–709 (2005), amended by Pub. L. No.
101–194, § 202, 103 Stat. 1724 (1991).
Independent Counsel Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1994).
Id.
The Free Dictionary, Independent Counsel, http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com
/independent+counsel (explaining that after independent counsels were used to investigate various scandals surrounding President Clinton, the law was allowed to expire).
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the Constitution’s exclusive grant of executive authority to the Presi282
The D.C. Circuit
dent—and officers directly controlled by him.
struck down the statute, holding that it violated executive authority
under the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted review under
the name Morrison v. Olson. In Morrison, a key question before the
Supreme Court was whether the act “impermissibly undermine[d]
the powers of the Executive Branch or ‘disrupt[ed] the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func283
tions.” Although the Court noted that the Act “reduces the amount
of control or supervision” the Executive Branch exercises over the
“investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal
284
activity,” sufficient control existed to satisfy Article II concerns. The
Court explained that because the Attorney General initiates the
process by calling for the appointment of an independent counsel,
285
the Act vested important authority within the Executive Branch.
Additionally, the Court found it significant that, once an independent counsel was appointed, the Attorney General defined the scope,
or jurisdiction, of the prosecution, and the independent prosecutor
286
was obligated to abide by the Justice Department’s policies. Finally,
the Court noted that, because the Attorney General retained the authority to remove the independent counsel for “good cause,” the Executive Branch enjoyed “substantial ability to ensure that the laws are
287
‘faithfully executed’ by an independent counsel.” The Morrison decision can thus be used as a template for permitting the private
288
prosecution of federal criminal cases generally.
The independent counsel, to be sure, is not quite the same thing
as a privately managed prosecution—largely in the sense that the na-

282

283

284
285
286
287
288

See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488–89 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the Ethics in
Government Act invades President’s executive privileges and responsibilities, endangering individual liberty as to be unconstitutional), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 695 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986), and Nixon
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
Id. at 695, 696.
Id. at 696.
Id.
Id.
Professor Myriam Gilles has similarly argued for use of Morrison as a possible model for
deputizing private citizens to enforce the nation’s civil rights laws. See Myriam E. Gilles,
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil
Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1436–37 (2000) (addressing the question of whether the
Executive Branch retains sufficient control of private enforcement actions).
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ture of the prosecution is supposed to reflect the public’s interest and
the targets are limited to certain high-level public officials. Still, the
independent counsel statute demonstrates a continued understand289
ing that government need not have an exclusive monopoly over the
prosecution of criminal acts. Presumably, if the requirements of Morrison are met, privately managed prosecutions could be initiated in
federal court for violations of federal criminal law.
Though private prosecutions for violations of the federal criminal
law have been virtually non-existent in modern times, they have occurred in certain instances. One such instance involves the appointment of private counsel to enforce court orders. The Supreme Court
in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. considered the propriety of appointing private counsel in a federal criminal contempt
290
Louis Vuitton Mallietier, the famed French fashion
proceeding.
goods manufacturer, hired counsel to press a civil claim on its behalf.
When the defendants in the civil suit violated the court’s order, the
district court appointed Vuitton’s lawyers to prosecute the criminal
291
contempt citation.
The Vuitton lawyers obtained a conviction in
federal district court. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, relying in large
part on the district court’s determination that the convictions did not
292
result in injustice to the defendants.
Not satisfied, the defendants
petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the district
court lacked the authority to appoint special prosecutors on the con293
tempt citations.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendants’ argument and instead found that the district court possessed
the inherent authority to initiate the contempt proceedings as well as
294
the power to appoint the special prosecutors.

289

290
291

292
293
294

Federal statutes creating private rights of action are as diverse and wide ranging as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, the Clayton Act, and the Consumer Products Safety Act. Each of these
acts requires, as a predicate, that the individual availing himself of the private right of action be in some way harmed by the defendant’s ostensibly unlawful conduct. For an interesting discussion of the numerous private causes of action extant in federal law, see
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
481 U.S. 787, 790, 808 (1987).
See id. at 790–92 (describing how the Court permitted Vuitton’s attorneys to prosecute a
criminal contempt action arising from the violation of the injunction against infringing
Vuitton’s trademark).
See United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1985).
See Young, 481 U.S. at 800 (noting the unavailing contention of the petitioners that a contempt prosecution may only be brought by the U.S. Attorney’s office).
See id. at 800–01 (describing the rationale for allowing district courts to initiate contempt
proceedings and appoint special prosecutors).
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The Court avoided the question whether it was constitutional to
permit private counsel to undertake the prosecution. Instead, pursuant to its authority to supervise lower federal courts, the Court held
that it was impermissible for the attorneys who represented the party
in the related civil matter to prosecute the adverse party for con295
tempt. In light of the fact that those lawyers represented an adverse
party in the civil case, the Court reasoned that they might not be as
296
sensitive to the public interest presented in the contempt citations.
The Court not only ducked the potential constitutional issue represented by having a private lawyer prosecute a criminal case, but it also
limited its ruling to circumstances in which the prosecution was in297
exorably intertwined with a parallel civil proceeding.
2. Federal Models of Private Justice
While not criminal prosecutions per se, federal statutes permit
private litigants to initiate qui tam actions and to act, in effect, as “private attorneys general” in diverse circumstances. Although federal
law generally eschews private criminal law enforcement, a number of
statutes do provide for alternative avenues by which an individual
harmed by the defendant’s conduct may enjoy a private right of action.
a. The False Claims Act
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730, contains a provision for
private qui tam actions that allows private citizens who provide information to the government regarding fraud committed against the
government to bring a civil action “for the person and for the United
States Government” to obtain a portion of the assigned damages and
298
penalties.
The Latin phrase qui tam is a shortened version of the
maxim “qui tam pro domino rege, etc. quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” which translates roughly as “[w]ho prosecutes this suit as well for
299
the king, etc. as for himself.” While the qui tam suit is almost the re-

295
296
297

298
299

See id. at 809 (“[C]ounsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be
appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order.”).
Id. at 805–06 (expounding on why the interest of the government and the interest of the
private party may not be fully aligned).
See id. at 814 (refusing to permit a prosecutor representing the private party beneficiary
of a court order in a contempt action to also represent the government in the contempt
action, as the attorney would be required to “serve two masters”).
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *161 & n.*.
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verse of a criminal suit, where the greatest harm presumably falls
upon the private citizen as victim rather than the government, the
underlying idea is the same: leveraging private law suits to benefit
the harmed individual as well as society in general. A private action
under the False Claims Act, however, is directly related to curbing
300
Essentially, private
criminal conduct by the putative defendant.
parties who have investigated and believe that they can prove that
other individuals or organizations have submitted false claims to the
301
federal government may file a private claim in federal court.
b. Environmental Crimes
Several federal environmental protection statutes allow private
parties to bring law suits against those who violate the nation’s envi302
ronmental laws; in fact, these citizen suits are relatively common303
place in environmental law enforcement statutes. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, for example, authorizes any “citizen,”
defined broadly as “a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected,” to enforce certain provisions of the Act or
to force appropriate governmental agencies to perform mandated
304
duties under the Act. Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended
(CERCLA), creates incentives for private parties to engage in environmental clean-up operations when identified by a private party
305
even before they have been sued by the government. In 2007, the
300

301
302

303

304
305

See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (“[O]nly a
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of
defrauding public funds.”).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(A), 3730(b) (2006).
Cass Sunstein has examined the rationale for, and circumstances of, so-called “citizens’
suits.” See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992) (noting congressional attempts to control unlawfully inadequate law enforcement through the “citizen-suit” device).
See JAMES T. BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
OF PUBLIC POLICY 50–51 (Roger Clegg & James L.J. Nuzzo eds., 1996) (“Citizen enforcement of environmental laws has been enshrined in the major environmental statutes for
years and is widely endorsed by state and federal environmental regulators, whose enforcement efforts are supplemented by citizen-plaintiffs at no cost to the public fisc.”);
Bucy, supra note 289, at 32 (noting that citizen suit provisions exist in over twenty environmental protection statutes).
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816, 888–89 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994)).
See Transcript of Record at 44, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128
(2007) (No. 06-562) (“There are more than 400,000 sites across the country that are contaminated by hazardous wastes. The amici States recognize that if these sites are to be
cleaned up, it’s going to take the work of private parties. In turn, we recognize that pri-
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Supreme Court validated CERCLA privately initiated actions in United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp., holding that the statute authorizes private parties to bring cost recovery actions to recoup response costs
they have incurred even where there has been no governmental en306
forcement activity.
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) cit307
izen suit provision, a private party may likewise bring suit against
one who contributed to the “handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi308
ronment.” The RCRA citizen suit provision permits recovery of attorney fees. The statute expressly authorizes the courts to “award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the
309
court determines such an award is appropriate.”
Although RCRA
310
citizen suits may be limited to injunctive relief, they are nevertheless
privately managed suits designed to enforce the nation’s environmental protection laws.

306

307
308
309
310

vate parties rely upon cost recovery to obtain their costs and financial incentives to do the
site cleanup.”); see also Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp.
1339, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1986) (establishing that the allegations in the private party’s complaint state a claim for cost recovery under CERCLA). At least one court has held that a
private litigant suing under CERCLA must first obtain governmental approval before
commencing remedial actions. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.
Supp. 1437, 1439 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that a private party could not bring a costrecovery action under CERCLA without first obtaining government approval). The EPA,
however, disagrees. According to the EPA, it should be “absolutely clear that no Federal
approval of any kind is a prerequisite to a cost recovery [action] under [CERCLA].” 50
Fed. Reg. 47,934 (Nov. 20, 1985). As the Honorable Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit
noted in Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., “this reading . . . [is] consistent with
CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose . . . [and] promotes the effectiveness of private enforcement actions under section 107(a) [of CERCLA] as a remedy independent of governmental actions financed by Superfund.” 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986).
Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 139 (“By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup
costs but does not create a right to contribution. A private party may recover under
§ 107(a) without any establishment of liability to a third party.”).
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section,
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . .”).
Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 6972(e).
See Annotation, Relief Available in Citizen’s Suit Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 6972 for Violation of Federal Requirements Relating to Solid or Hazardous Waste, 71 A.L.R. FED. 181, 182, 183 (1985)
(noting that “RCRA does not specify the relief which may be available in such citizen
suits,” but at least one court has held that “nothing in RCRA bars injunctive relief”).
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c. Antitrust Enforcement
A long-standing feature of American antitrust law is to use private
parties to enforce the nation’s laws prohibiting anti-competitive mer311
gers and acquisitions.
Indeed, “[t]he reach of the U.S. antitrust
laws, both in terms of subject matter and territorial application, is as
broad for private lawsuits as for criminal enforcement actions by the
312
federal antitrust authorities.”
It is significant, then, that the reach
of private lawsuits would be co-extensive with the reach of the criminal law in antitrust enforcement. Presumably, the parties seeking enforcement have an interest in doing so as an interested party. In fact,
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 allowed injured parties to seek enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws by permitting them treble
313
damages. The concept of using the injured party as a means of enforcing the law, then, has considerable purchase in federal law.
Similarly, the Clayton Act authorizes a private right of action to allow injured parties to recover the monetary value of the injury in314
curred.
The Act further authorizes private litigants to obtain in315
To this end, the court may even restructure the
junctive relief.
market to eliminate the competitive harm created by the unlawful
conduct and to ensure that the sued parties cannot continue to pur316
sue unlawful enterprises.
Moreover, Congress also expressly allowed private litigants to obtain treble damages as a means of creat317
ing an incentive for private antitrust enforcement activity.

311

312
313

314
315
316

317

See 51 CONG. REC. 16,319 (1914) (“Under section 4 of the bill reported by the conferees
any person injured in his business or property by anything declared to be unlawful in any
antitrust law or by this act is entitled to go into any district court without regard to the
amount in controversy and recover threefold damages.”).
Neil R. Ellis, Private Lawsuits in International Antitrust 1 (Oct. 13, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.fdblawyers.com/PDF/private_law_suits_paper.doc.).
See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat 209, 210 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)) (noting that an injured party “shall recover three fold the damages
by him sustained”).
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (providing authorization for parties injured by acts forbidden under the antitrust laws to initiate a private right of action and obtain monetary damages).
Id. § 26 (affording private parties injunctive relief “against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws”).
Interestingly, state governments may also initiate lawsuits challenging alleged antitrust
violations under the federal antitrust laws on behalf of the consumers within their state.
See id. § 15c(a) (authorizing state attorney generals to bring a civil action on behalf of the
citizens within their respective states).
See 51 CONG. REC. 16,319 (1914) (reporting the statement of Mr. Floyd that “[w]e have
taken, by these provisions, the business public into our confidence as allies of the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws, and given to the business men of the country
who are being imposed upon by unlawful combinations remedies by which they can re-
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Congress, understanding that federal enforcement authorities alone
lacked sufficient resources, attempted to leverage private litigation as
a way of improving antitrust compliance with the law.
Interestingly, the ability to bring private litigation spans the full
range of conduct deemed unlawful under the antitrust laws—
including not simply price fixing cartels, but also output restrictions,
territorial allocations, resale price maintenance, other vertical restraints, and inappropriate mergers, for example. Private parties can
even challenge conduct that the government declines to pursue. In
fact, private parties can challenge a merger already approved by the
318
The Act
relevant federal authorities and actually consummated.
encourages the leveraging of private resources to enforce the law and
illustrates just how close the federal government is to using private
prosecutions of the criminal law to enforce federal standards.
d. Private Enforcement of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act
The use of private enforcement has extended even to statutes
such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
319
(RICO), which is primarily a tool of criminal prosecutors. Congress
enacted RICO as part of a comprehensive crime bill intended to protect the public from “parties who conduct organizations affecting in320
terstate commerce through a pattern of criminal activity.”
Gov321
ernment prosecutors use (and, some argue, abuse) RICO as a tool
to obtain lengthy prison sentences, heavy fines, and the forfeiture of
any ill-gotten gains from criminal enterprises or legitimate organiza322
tions operating in a criminal manner. Under RICO’s private attorney general provision, private individuals harmed by alleged RICO
violations are authorized to sue for treble damages and to collect at-

318
319

320
321

322

cover their own damages . . . without waiting upon the slow and tortuous course of prosecution on the part of the Government”).
See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (enabling private parties injured from a violation of antitrust
laws to seek injunctive relief).
See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006)
(providing that “[a]ny person injured in his business or propery by reason of a violation
of . . . this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court”).
115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
David B. Sentelle, RICO: The Monster that Ate Jurisprudence, Remarks at the CATO Institute
Seminar on RICO, Rights and the Constitution (Oct. 18, 1989) (copy on file with the Cato Institute).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–63 (detailing criminal penalties for individuals convicted of receiving income derived from racketeering-related activities).
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323

torney’s fees. Indeed, with the exception that privately led prosecutions cannot seek prison terms for punishment, there is arguably little
difference between private parties exacting heavy fines and the government doing so. It is generally understood that RICO’s treble
damages provision is intended to provide an incentive for private litigants to bring claims. Then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Strom Thurmond explained that:
[T]his private cause of action was included as an incentive for victims of
organized crime activity to redress wrongful actions against their legitimate businesses. Because of the limited resources available to assist the
Government in its fight against organized crime, it was believed that “pri324
vate attorneys general” could supplement Government efforts.

Senator Thurmond’s statement serves as acknowledgement that the
private civil cause of action is a means to buttress federal criminal law
enforcement efforts. However, unlike the environmental and antitrust private rights of action aimed at enforcing federal regulations,
the private attorneys general provision of RICO is specifically aimed
at corrupt organizations and intended to vindicate the aims of federal
325
criminal law.
III. PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS OF PRIVATELY MANAGED PROSECUTIONS
Without question, the notion of privately initiated, privately managed, and privately financed criminal prosecutions remains controversial. Although commentators often see little problem with private
civil law enforcement, such as in the antitrust or environmental are326
nas; arguments on behalf of private criminal prosecutions are often
323
324

325
326

See id. § 1964(c) (describing civil remedies available to individuals harmed by alleged
RICO violations).
Oversight of Civil RICO Suits: Hearings on Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18
U.S.C. 1964(c) Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (opening statement
of Chairman Strom Thurmond).
See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 80–81 (1969) (elaborating on the rationale for permitting civil
remedies for RICO).
See Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 175 (2008)
(describing how access to the courts for suits could facilitate combat against climate
change); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 957
(1985) (noting that “private enforcement helped to keep compliance issues high on the
agendas of top [environmental law] agency officials and gave additional urgency to their
attempts to abate the most serious violations”); Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent,
“The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 269, 271 (2005) (commencing a discussion on enforcement mechanisms
created by Congress to enable the Environmental Protection Agency to achieve compliance with environmental regulation).
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327

met with considerable hostility.
The purpose of this section is to
consider several of these arguments and to examine circumstances in
which privately managed prosecutions might, like citizen suits, be
used to serve both public and private interests.
A. Potential Constitutional Impediments to Private Prosecutions
Of all the criticisms leveled against the use of privately managed
prosecutions, the most damning are those that argue private prosecu328
tions are inherently unconstitutional.
Such arguments, offered in
329
330
both scholarly journals and judicial opinions, are generally tied to
the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Vesting Clause of Article II. First, critics argue
that criminal defendants have a right under the Fourteenth Amend331
ment’s Due Process Clause to an impartial prosecutor.
In these
criticisms, it is averred that a prosecutor who has any sort of stake in
the criminal trial’s outcome violates the process owed the criminal
defendant. Second, critics argue that a system of private justice inevi-

327

328

329
330

331

See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47
ARK. L. REV. 511, 557 (1994) (stating that “the time has come to end the anachronistic
practice of allowing private prosecutors”); Julio Pérez Gil, Private Interests Seeking Punishment: Prosecution Brought by Private Individuals and Groups in Spain, 25 LAW AND POL’Y 151,
162–65 (2003) (arguing that private actions neither strengthen democracy nor serve as a
check on prosecutorial discretion); Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 279, 286 (2001) (noting that “the need
for private prosecutors in Viginina no longer exists, and has not existed since the early
eighteenth century”); Sidman, supra note 26, at 773–74 (same); John A.J. Ward, Note,
Private Prosecution—The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1171–79 (1972) (arguing that private prosecutions violate due process and ethics rules). Indeed, one of the
rare articles advocating private prosecutions appeared in 1955. See Comment, Private
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
More recently, Bruce L. Benson, in TO SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND
COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998), has encouraged private prosecution as a means
of increasing victim restitution.
See Bessler, supra note 327, at 558 (suggesting that “private prosecutors violate defendants’ due process rights” because they “have financial incentives that public prosecutors
do not” and because they “create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety”).
See, e.g., id. at 557–58 (suggesting the unconstitutionality of private prosecutions).
See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319
(5th Cir. 1969) (noting the unconstitutionality of permitting private prosecutions); see also People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (commenting on
the unconstitutionality of permitting private prosecutions).
See Bessler, supra note 327, at 552 (stating that “[f]airness of course requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases,” thus, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))); Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to
Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 495 (1988)
(“The primary problem with these statutes is that they compromise a criminal defendant’s due process right to be prosecuted by a disinterested prosecutor.”).
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332

tably benefits the rich.
While this argument does not squarely fit
into any specific constitutional right, it most likely implicates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, with
respect to the private enforcement of federal criminal law, critics
claim that permitting anyone outside the direct control of the Executive Branch to initiate a prosecution violates Article II’s Vesting
333
Clause, which locates all executive power within the President.
1. Due Process Concerns
Critics of privately managed prosecutions generally posit two interrelated arguments in objecting to the appointment of such prosecutors. Essentially, it is argued that criminal defendants are owed
“impartial” prosecutors as a matter of fundamental fairness and that,
as such, appointing private prosecutors to a criminal case violates due
process because private prosecutions entail an inherent conflict of in334
terest.
Certainly, the overriding due process concern is to ensure that the
procedures by which the laws are applied against the individual are
carried out in an even-handed manner so that the accused is not sub335
jected to the arbitrary exercise of government power. Exactly what

332

333

334

335

See Bessler, supra note 327, at 589–90 (comparing how public prosecutors treat criminal
assaults on the poor just as seriously as they respond to those on the rich while private
prosecutors treat wealthy individuals better than poor ones); Joseph E. Kennedy, Private
Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality in the
Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665, 706 (1997) (“Privately financed victims will enjoy preferential access to justice.”).
See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
346 (1989) (“[A]n enforcement remedy being pursued solely to protect the public interest, as distinguished from a private attorney general action with public interest overtones,
is exclusively within the province of the Executive Branch.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting William H. Lewis, Environmentalists’ Authority to Sue Industry for Civil Penalties is Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10101,
10104 (1986))); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 274, at 660 (showing that the
power to prosecute public violations of the law was historically attached to the executive
power).
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935) (suggesting the primary goal of private prosecutors in criminal cases is not to ensure that justice is done but rather to win
the case); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (“[P]rivate
prosecutions by interested parties or their attorneys present inherent conflicts of interest
which violate defendants’ due process rights.”); Bessler, supra note 327, at 558 (“[P]rivate
prosecutors violate defendants’ due process rights.”).
In circumstances in which a criminal defendant has enjoyed a fair trial, represented by
counsel, and with all the other benefits provided by the Bill of Rights, the issue is not how
the procedure might have specifically affected him, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, whether he is deprived of liberty without due proc-
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procedures are needed to satisfy due process, however, will vary depending on the circumstances and the possible punishment the indi336
vidual is facing—for example, deprivation of liberty or property.
When due process is discussed, it is generally understood in terms of
337
either procedural due process or substantive due process.
As the
nomenclature suggests, one arm of due process deals with specific
procedural rights guaranteed the defendant, the other with more
substantive rights enjoyed by the individual. To determine whether
procedural due process interests have been met, courts look to history. Courts thus often determine due process requirements by examining the common law, including that of England during precolonial times. Depending upon one’s interpretive philosophy, special consideration is afforded the public meaning of the law in place
338
at the time of the Constitution’s ratification. Since private prosecutions were practiced at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, they
clearly satisfy this standard. Nevertheless, reference to history is not
always dispositive; otherwise, the procedure of the first half of the
seventeenth century would be “fastened upon American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional
339
amendment.”
Procedural guarantees to criminal defendants, in
particular, experienced significant changes in the latter half of the
twentieth century—changes adopted by courts to ensure greater fairness to those accused of criminal conduct.
Although due process tolerates certain variances in procedure
340
“appropriate to the nature of the case,” common ground exists.
First, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified depri-

336

337
338

339
340

ess of law. See, e.g., Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894) (discussing the
scope of the phrase “due process of law”).
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) (discussing what constitutes “due
course of law” under the Connecticut Constitution); see also Hagar v. Reclamation Dist.
No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) (“It is sufficient to observe here, that by ‘due process’ is
meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the
parties to be affected.”).
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (emphasizing that the
categories of substantive and procedural due process are distinct).
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (alterations to due process requirements should never entirely disregard the fundamental principles of “ancient procedure”); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899) (noting that, while states maintain
control over the procedure of their courts, such procedure should not conflict with fundamental guarantees of the United States Constitution); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528 (“[A]
process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law,
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country . . . .”).
Twining, 211 U.S. at 101.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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341

vation of life, liberty, or property.” Due process thus lays down certain procedures to allow individuals to challenge the state’s attempt
342
to deprive them of their rights. Principles established in the Bill of
Rights, especially when it pertains to criminal law, establish the basic
343
requirements: grand jury indictment (although not incorporated
344
345
346
against the states); notice and a jury trial before an impartial
347
348
judge; an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of
349
350
The Constituadverse witnesses; and representation by counsel.
tion, however, is silent on the nature or function of prosecutors.
Beyond these basic requirements, courts, lawyers, and scholars
have long debated precisely what procedures are constitutionally due
351
the criminal defendant.
Although the Constitution’s text establishes certain basic procedural requirements, the question as to
whether a state-provided prosecutor is also “due” has never been answered by the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Court has never held
that, as a matter of substantive due process, criminal defendants are
entitled to an “impartial” prosecutor in the same way they are entitled
to an impartial jury. In fact, the Supreme Court has observed that

341

342
343
344

345
346
347
348

349

350
351

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344
(1976) (“[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the
truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases . . . .”).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) (explaining the history underlying the right to
grand jury indictment).
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 516 (1884) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment
due process does not necessarily require indictment by grand jury in a state prosecution
murder).
See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 (1896) (describing a defendant’s right to know
the “nature and cause of the accusation against him”).
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (holding that U.S. citizens are entitled
to a trial by jury in serious criminal cases).
See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”).
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965) (describing the guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall have an opportunity to confront witnesses against him).
See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (accepting a statement by the defendant that
“[i]f there was . . . a denial of cross-examination without waiver, it would be constitutional
error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure
it”).
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (noting that the Sixth Amendment establishes a defendant’s right to counsel).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–18 (2004) (examining debate over Miranda, Dickerson, and other constitutional doctrines); Benjamin J.
Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the Limited Role of
Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 891–95 (2004) (dicussing constitutional interpretation
of the Apprendi line of cases).
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public prosecutors “need not be entirely ‘neutral and detached’”
and faced, in Faulder v. Johnson, with the issue of whether private
prosecutions violated the Due Process clause, the Court declined to
353
grant certiorari review.
The Court has, however, required that a state provide a jury trial
354
355
before an impartial judicial officer, the right to an attorney’s help,
356
the right to present evidence and give argument, and the opportu357
nity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The Court
has even placed affirmative obligations on prosecutors, such as the
requirement that each element of crime be proved beyond a reason358
able doubt, that exculpatory evidence be provided to the defen359
dant and that, pursuant to the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right
360
to be free from compelled self-incrimination, the prosecutor not
361
comment on the defendant’s exercise of her right to remain silent.
In Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme Court established a framework
for litigating due process claims and for determining what process is
362
due the claimant. In its decision, the Court set forth three factors
that courts needed to consider before a substantive due process right
363
could be established.
First, the Court found it necessary to determine the nature of the private interest “affected by the official ac364
tion.” Second, the Court required analysis of the possibility of “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
365
procedural safeguards.” Finally, the Court required weighing of the
government’s concerns (as well as its interest in having clear proce352
353
354
355
356

357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365

Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 248.
Faulder v. Johnson, 525 U.S. 1125 (1998).
See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (expressing the right to an impartial judge).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (requiring attorney representation at
trial).
See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 739 (2006) (discussing the right to present evidence);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857–58 (1975) (emphasizing the defendant’s role in
the fact-finding process).
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–17 (1974) (expounding on the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee to confront witnesses).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970) (explaining the reasonable doubt requirement).
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–13 (1976) (requiring prosecutors to turn over
material exculpatory evidence).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (forbidding comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id.
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dures) against whatever burdens the additional procedures might
366
To some extent, Mathews v. Eldridge recognizes the benefit
create.
of examining the procedures applicable in the context of a specific
case as opposed to articulating a specific list of procedures that are
constitutionally due.
It is possible to read the criminal procedure guarantees found in
the Constitution as assuming that a prosecutor might in general be
biased against the accused and will inevitably possess certain advantages over the defendant. By the time the prosecutor has initiated a
case, she would be expected to harbor a bias in favor of conviction.
Only during the investigative phase or at the point of deciding to
pursue a prosecution might the public prosecutor be expected to be
more impartial than a private one.
Arguably, the stronger due process concern surfaces in the context of a concern about the prosecutor’s motivations and the existence of an inherent conflict whenever a private attorney handles a
criminal prosecution (I will have more to say about this issue below).
It is generally understood that the duty owed by a lawyer to his client
is that of “zealously assert[ing] the client’s position under the rules of
367
the adversary system.” Presumably, that duty would extend to a privately hired prosecutor. Such a prosecutor should, just as the plaintiff’s lawyer in a civil case should, vigorously prosecute the case on
behalf of her client, presumptively the victim of the alleged crime.
The Supreme Court, while never directly addressing the due process
interest involved in the appointment of a private prosecutor, has recognized that prosecutors, unlike adversary counsel interested in prevailing in civil litigation, have a larger public interest at stake in ensuring that justice shall be done. In Berger v. United States, the Court
explained the prosecutor’s duty as follows:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from

366
367

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2006).
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improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
368
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

The Court offers a compelling view of the prosecutor. The implicit
point made by the Court is that private counsel in civil suits are less
interested in “justice” and more interested in winning the case.
However, this view of the public prosecutor’s obligations is not strikingly different from the obligation shouldered by any member of the
bar. After all, as a member of the legal profession, a lawyer is also “an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special respon369
sibility for the quality of justice.”
While the stakes of a civil trial may at times be significantly more
substantial than those of a criminal trial—for example, paying a
$100,000 fine versus spending thirty days in jail—society tends to
370
stigmatize criminal prosecution far more than a civil lawsuit.
As a
consequence, we mandate counsel for defendants in criminal trials
371
but generally not in civil trials. The impecunious litigant must rely
on a contingency fee to lure counsel to take a civil case. Given the
“all or nothing” stakes of a contingency fee, one would expect counsel to be interested not only in prevailing, but in securing the largest
award possible. Therefore, public prosecutors may appear to have
less at stake than a private prosecutor would. If the private prosecutor takes the prosecution on a contingency fee basis or is himself the
victim, this may be true, but does not have to be the case. To remedy
the “self interest” effect, states could simply forbid contingency fees
in criminal cases for private prosecutors in the same way that such
fees are disallowed for criminal defense attorneys. Similarly, states
could adopt rules that place an affirmative obligation on private
counsel to keep the interests of the state or the public in mind as she
pursues a case. And, in consideration of the adage that a man who
represents himself in a proceeding has a fool for a client, states could
disallow actual victims from themselves serving as prosecutors.

368
369
370

371

See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (articulating the role of the prosecutor).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2006).
See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Effect Theory, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 721 (discussing “the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions”
that creates a social stigma for the latter, but not the former).
But see Assem. B. 590, 10th Sess. (Ca. 2009), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0910/bill/asm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20090225_introduced.pdf (proposed California
“Civil Gideon” bill that was recently signed into law). For a discussion of the “Civil Gideon’s” recent ascent to law in California and relevant criticisms, see The Blackbook Legal
Blog, Introducing the “Civil Gideon,” http://blackbooklegal.blogspot.com/2009/10/
introducing-civil-gideon.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
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Still problematic, however, is the possibility that a private prosecutor, motivated by the prospect of a fee, may decide to undertake a
prosecution when, in a reasonable public prosecutor’s discretion, no
prosecution should be undertaken at all. However, no criminal de372
fendant has a right “not” to be prosecuted. Rather, in federal law,
373
as in many states, the accused have a right to grand jury indictment.
Thus, most cases undeserving of prosecution ought to be weeded out
as the Framers intended. Even if the decision whether to take a case
to the grand jury at all is a sensitive one, then certainly a private prosecutor could be required to obtain the local public prosecutor’s approval before proceeding with a case—both in convening a grand
jury or, even if a grand jury has already handed down an indictment,
deciding whether it should proceed to trial. In reality, fairly simple
rules can be put in place to ensure defendants’ due process rights
while still utilizing a private prosecutor.
The more consequential issue may not be for the defendant, but
for the complainant. The defendant has no right to a conflict-free
prosecution, but the complainant does, as does the public. While a
lawyer’s obligation is to represent zealously the interests of her client,
constitutional requirements relating to the disclosure of exculpatory
374
evidence to the defendant and, if the interests of justice demand it,
375
to end the prosecution altogether, may conflict with the obligation
to the complainant. Similarly, the private prosecutor’s interests in
advancing the complainant’s cause may cause tension with her responsibility to the public at large.
It is possible, however, to mitigate the conflict in the same manner
in which conflicts are handled in multi-defendant cases or where other conflicts of interest exist. Courts allow defense lawyers to represent multiple defendants in circumstances in which conflicts may exist provided that those potential conflicts are revealed to the
376
377
defendants, the defendants are made to understand them, and

372

373
374
375
376
377

Cardenas, supra note 40, at 374–77 (examining a civilian’s ability to initiate a prosecution); Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking
Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 107–18 (1992) (arguing that public prosecution is not an element of fundamental fairness).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (“[T]he prosecuting party may
relinquish his suit at any stage of it, and withdraw from court at his option . . . .”).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2) (stating that the court must advise each defendant in the case of
a defense conflict of interest).
See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 797–98 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating it is
accepted that “trial court inquiry into whether the defendant has made a knowing and vo-
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the defendants agree to waive their right to conflict-free representa378
tion. If the private prosecutor is held to the same standard of conduct as the public prosecutor, which must be the case if such a prosecution is to survive constitutional scrutiny, then the judge may
inquire of the defendant whether he understands the nature of the
potential conflict and is willing, nevertheless, to waive it. In addition,
if one understands the public prosecutor as the people’s representative, then his agreement to appoint, or to acquiesce in the appointment of, a private prosecutor may serve as a waiver of the public interest in the prosecution.
2. Equal Protection Concerns
The equal protection concerns are basically two-fold: first, that
the rich, who can afford private counsel, enjoy an advantage over the
poor. The wealthy can pursue a prosecution in circumstances in
which a person of lesser means might not be able to. Second, a defendant privately prosecuted may be worse off than had he been
prosecuted by a public official who, because the public prosecutor
arguably bears a larger responsibility for pursuing justice than the victim-oriented private prosecutor; thus, he will be more balanced and
objective in his prosecutorial approach.
This concern about improved access to quality justice based on
economic grounds is certainly a meritorious point when considering
public policy, but it is difficult to fashion it as an equal protection argument. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying any person within its jurisdiction
379
the equal protection of the laws. In other words, the law must treat
an individual in the same manner as others similarly situated. Ordinarily, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause occurs when a state

378

379

luntary waiver of his right to conflict-free representation is strongly encouraged, if not required”).
Professor Davis makes a similar point with respect to private prosecutions in New York.
See Davis, supra note 203, at 386–87 (noting that private prosecutors can avoid conflict
problems under the existing framework under New York’s professional conduct rules that
only allow a lawyer to represent clients with divergent interests after complete disclosure
where it is obvious the lawyer can adequately represent both).
See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Professor Kennedy makes the related point that the
“[p]referential access to justice” the wealthy may enjoy “threatens the defendant’s distinct
interest in equality.” Joseph E. Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the
Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 665, 705–08 (1997).
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grants a particular class of individuals the right to engage in an activ380
ity and yet denies other individuals the same right.
The Supreme Court has established varying tests to determine
whether an equal protection violation has occurred: generally, it depends on the type of classification the state has made and its effect on
fundamental rights. Traditionally, the Court finds a state classification constitutional if it has a rational basis “related to a legitimate
381
state interest.”
The Supreme Court, however, will strictly scruti382
383
Here,
nize a distinction when it involves a “suspect distinction.”
the argument might be that the poor are discriminated against in a
system that relies on private prosecution because they are unable to
avail themselves of prosecutors. “In order for a classification to be
subject to strict scrutiny, however, it must be shown that the state law
or its administration is intended to discriminate” and that there
384
would be no legitimate state purpose.
It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove whether a state that permitted private prosecutions intended to discriminate against anyone. Moreover, the Court
has never found economic status to be a “suspect class” in the same
385
way as race or national origin. The Court also applies a strict scrutiny test if the classification interferes with a fundamental right—such
386
as a First Amendment right or the right to vote.
The Court, how-

380

381
382

383
384

385
386

See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (“Our equal protection
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect
some groups of citizens differently than others.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425 (1961))).
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 813 (2008).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny); Delight, Inc. v. Balt.
County, 624 F.2d 12, 14 (4th Cir. 1980) (describing strict scrutiny standard, but holding it
does not apply); LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA.,
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATOR’S MUNICIPAL DESKBOOK 49 (3d ed. 2006) (clarifying the three
levels of scrutiny under equal protection analysis).
See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (referencing suspect classifications).
Kermit Roosevelt III, Compelling State Interest, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES 341, 341 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006) (stating that strict scrutiny applies where
there is “discrimination either with respect to a fundamental right or on the basis of a
‘suspect classification’”).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 29 (explaining that economic status does not
receive strict scrutiny).
Roosevelt, supra note 384, at 341 (“[S]ome (although not all) infringements on fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny. Fundamental rights include textually specified rights
such as the protections of speech and religion found in the Bill of Rights, and also some
unenumerated rights, such as the right to travel interstate or the right of access to the
courts.”). For discussion of fundamental rights in another context, see Sarah Elizabeth
Saucedo, Majority Rules Except in New Mexico: Constitutional and Policy Concerns Raised by
New Mexico’s Supermajority Requirement for Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 194 (2006).
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ever, has never found an affirmative “right to prosecution.” Thus, it
is difficult to see how the Court would countenance an equal protection challenge to a private prosecution on the ground of economic
inequality. And while the wealthy presumably would have better access to more talented attorneys, it is unclear that the poor would be
disadvantaged in a system that permitted private prosecutions as an
adjunct to the general, and more common and equally available, system of public prosecutions. One could argue that, as a practical matter, if those who could afford private criminal prosecutions (like
wealthy individuals or corporations) shouldered the financial burden
for crimes committed against them, then more resources might be
available for the government to pursue crimes committed against
persons less fortunate and therefore less able to afford to hire private
counsel—in turn, making “equal protection” more likely, not less.
An alternative equal protection argument might be that a particular defendant was “selectively prosecuted” and that a public prosecutor might not have brought the case. Essentially, this criticism demands that equal protection requires all individuals to be prosecuted
by a public prosecutor and, that if some individuals were to be prosecuted by a private prosecution, as opposed to a public one, the Equal
Protection Clause would be violated. While this sort of argument is
invoked in several contexts, it would be difficult to show that the “system” of private prosecutions violated the Equal Protection Clause.
After all, the system would function similarly to the public one in
which one prosecutor in the District Attorney’s Office might be more
inclined to recommend prosecution than another.
More likely, in situations such as these a claim would be based on
an “as applied” challenge levied against a particular prosecutor and
would not invalidate a system using privately managed prosecutions.
Even with respect to an “as applied” challenge to an individual prosecutor, however, the claimant would have to demonstrate that similiarly situated individuals were not being prosecuted. Aside from the
practical difficulties of making such a showing, it is unclear a prosecution could be sustained absent a showing to the court of sufficient
evidence consistent with guilt. If grand jury indictment were required prior to commencing a private prosecution, presumably no
case undeserving of prosecution would go forward. Moreover, such
concerns would also be alleviated to the extent that appointment of
the private prosecutor was certified by the public prosecutor or the
trial court. In any event, an Equal Protection challenge to private
prosecutions, especially a facial challenge to a statute or rule allowing
such prosecutions, would likely be of little merit.
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3. A Unique Federal Concern: Article II and the Unitary Executive
An additional argument against the appointment of a private
prosecutor—at least at the federal level—is that such an appointment
violates Article II of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
387
America.” The argument is that an “inherently executive function”
vested in the President cannot be delegated out either to another
branch of the government, to another governmental authority out388
side the Executive Branch or, presumably, to a private entity. The
power to prosecute a criminal offense is such an inherently executive
function, it has been argued, that a private prosecution would violate
Article II.
While a fulsome discussion of federal executive power and theories about a “unitary executive” exceeds the scope of this Article, it is
noteworthy that the Supreme Court has never ruled that the prosecu389
torial function may be exercised only by Executive Branch officials.
The Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., upheld a
district court’s authority to appoint a private prosecutor in a criminal
contempt proceeding, even where it disallowed it under the specific
390
factual circumstances of that case.
Of course, statutory authority
similarly vests the district courts with the authority to appoint U.S. Attorneys where vacancies occur that have not yet been filled by the
President.
In the seminal case of Morrison v. Olsen, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment of an independent counsel under the Ethics in
391
Government Act.
The Court upheld the independent counsel’s
appointment in no small part because that appointment did not rep-

387

388

389

390
391

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Obviously, such an argument would not be applicable to the
states unless they had an Article II analogue in their own constitutions and their courts
had adopted a unitary executive type understanding of state executive power.
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1997) (“[T]he doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive
Branch . . . .”). For a discussion concerning delegations of executive power, see Paul R.
Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 699–700 (showing the debate regarding executive functions); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988) (commencing discussion of whether the independent counsel provision violates separation of powers principles); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Validity, Under State Law, of Appointment of Independent Special Prosecutor to Handle
Political or Controversial Prosecutions or Investigations of Persons Other than Regular Prosecutor,
84 A.L.R. 3D 29, 40–41 (1978) (discussing violations of separation of powers); Verkuil, supra note 388, at 310 (laying out parameters of the duty to govern).
481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987).
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695.
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resent a situation in which Congress sought to increase its power at
392
Thus, the Act posed no
the expense of the executive authority.
“dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch func393
tions,” nor was it “a case in which the power to remove an executive
official has been completely stripped from the President;” rather,
“because the independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good
cause,’ the Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample
authority to assure that the counsel is competentely performing his or
394
her statutory responsibilities.”
Morrison implies that, for a private prosecution to occur at the
federal level, the prosecutor must be controlled to some degree by
the Executive Branch and may additionally require some sort of imprimatur of the Judicial Branch. To meet this standard, a private
prosecutor could be retained and deputized by the federal prosecutor’s office. Moreover, the relationship between a private prosecutor
and the U.S. Attorney might be fashioned far more closely than that
with an independent counsel and thus, would more easily meet the
constitutional threshold. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney could retain control by approving the prosecution and, when necessary, terminating it
if he or she believed it was in the interests of justice to do so.
B.

Prudential Concerns

In addition to the constitutional arguments raised against private
prosecutions, at least two significant prudential concerns must be addressed: namely, that a private prosecutor harbors an inherent conflict between the victim’s specific interests and society’s interest in justice; and secondly, that private justice systems have not generally
proven successful in achieving important public policy objectives.
The ethical issues raised by the potential conflicts faced by a privately hired prosecutor bear serious analysis. Such conflicts, however,
are not alien to the legal system and arise in a number of different
contexts. With respect to whether privately managed prosecutions
will further the goals of the criminal justice system—including punishing the guilty, providing general and specific deterrence, and securing domestic tranquility—so few such prosecutions occur that it is
difficult to gauge their effect. Nevertheless, scholars have examined
other forms of so-called private justice, including the use of qui tam

392
393
394

Id. at 694.
Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)).
Id. at 692.
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396

actions and the promotion of private causes of action to permit
those injured by certain activities to sue and, through the civil justice
system, collect restitution. I will consider each of these arguments in
397
turn.
1. Ethical Conflicts and the Private Prosecutor
Ordinarily, the issue of a conflict of interest arises when counsel
enjoys a pecuniary interest or has a fiduciary duty adverse to her po398
The underlying idea is that competing incentives
tential client.
prevent counsel’s interests from being as closely aligned with the interests of the client. In a private prosecution, the question is whether
the private prosecutor can serve both the client’s presumable interest
in convicting the defendant and the public’s interest in justice—for
399
“the duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct examine the relationship between a lawyer and his or her
clients and defines what constitutes a “conflict of interest.” Model
Rule 1.7, which addresses conflicts of interest involving current clients, dictates that: “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” The Rule explains that such a conflict exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another

395

396

397
398
399

See generally James M. Atwood, False Claims Act—Section 3730(e)(3) of False Claims Act Bars
Qui Tam Suit That Gives No Useful or Proper Return to the Government—United States ex rel.
S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320 (1st Cir. 1994), 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949
(1995); Caminker, supra note 333; Dan D. Pitzer, The Qui Tam Doctrine: A Comparative
Analysis of Its Application in the United States and the British Commonwealth, 7 TEX. INT’L L.J.
415 (1972); Charles N. Drennan, Comment, Qui Tam Actions under the 1899 Refuse Act:
Possibility of Individual Legal Action to Prevent Water Pollution, 36 MO. L. REV. 498 (1971).
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669 (1986); James L. Miller, Federal Securities Laws: Private Causes of Action Under Section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 AKRON L. REV. 362 (1979); Wilbur Owens,
Export Controls—A Private Cause of Action Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 15 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371 (1985); Rita M. Theisen, Recent Developments in Private Rights of Action Under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 19 (1987).
While doubtless other arguments against private prosecutions may exist, those outlined
here appear far more frequently both in the relevant literature and in judicial opinions.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–.8 (2006) (barring lawyers from representing clients when there are personal or professional conflicts of interest).
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 31.2(c) (1993).
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client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
400
lawyer.

The Supreme Court in Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
touched on what it believed may be a conflict of interest in the con401
text of a privately managed prosecution.
In that case, fashion
leather goods manufacturer Louis Vuitton had brought suit against
alleged trademark infringers who manufactured and distributed imitations of Vuitton’s goods. As part of a settlement agreement, the alleged infringers agreed to a permanent injunction against any such
402
activity.
Having learned that the product infringement appeared to be
continuing, Vuitton’s attorneys requested that the district court appoint them as special counsel to prosecute the criminal contempt ac403
tion for the alleged injunction violation. The district court granted
404
the request, appointing them as special counsel, and a jury subse405
Appealing to the
quently convicted the defendants of contempt.
Second Circuit, defendants argued that the appointment of Vuitton’s
406
attorneys instead of disinterested counsel was erroneous.
The Supreme Court held that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt
407
The Court noted
prosecutions for alleged violation of that order.
that because federal prosecutors have the unique duty to seek justice
and not merely convict, they are prohibited from representing the
government in a manner where they, their family, or their business
408
associates have any particularized interest.
The private attorney
who undertakes a prosecution, the Court concluded, should be simi409
larly “disinterested.” Here, because the lawyers who prosecuted the
case could potentially benefit in a subsequent civil suit from obtaining a criminal conviction in the case at hand, they could not be
410
deemed “disinterested” prosecutors.
The Court thus determined
that the prosecutors were necessarily interested. As a consequence,
the Court refused to apply harmless error analysis in light of the per-

400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2006).
481 U.S. 787 (1987).
Id. at 790–91.
Id.
Id. at 791–92.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805–06.
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vasive effects of appointing an interested prosecutor.
Explaining
that it would require analysis not of what the private prosecutors did,
but what they refrained from doing at trial and prior to trial, the confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding was under412
mined.
Nevertheless, the Court’s issue was not with the private
prosecution per se, but with the fact that those particular private
prosecutors had a parallel interest in the case and were not sufficiently “disinterested.”
Setting aside the practical concern of whether it is always the case
that a prosecutor is “disinterested” in the outcome of a criminal trial,
is it ever possible for a private attorney, especially one retained by the
victim, to be sufficiently disinterested in a criminal prosecution? The
difficulty is more apparent with an attorney hired by the victim, because an attorney has a responsibility to vigorously represent the interests of the client within the bounds of the law. It is possible that,
despite the lawyer’s obligation to the justice system, the incentive a
lawyer has to advocate on behalf of her client may overwhelm that
counsel’s interest in protecting the criminal justice system or in fulfilling her duties as an officer to the court. Of course, that is a risk
that all defense counsel runs—that their obligation to their clients
will blind them as to their obligation to justice, more generally, but it
is traditionally a risk society is willing to run on behalf of the criminal
defendant.
It is markedly different when we consider a lawyer representing
the interests of a victim in a criminal prosecution. Because our system is designed to give the criminal defendant the benefit of the
413
doubt, and because we believe those who prosecute criminal cases
must also have the larger interests of justice in mind, first and foremost, there is an uneasiness that attends a victim-centric criminal justice system. Following Vuitton, the Fourth Circuit Court in Person v.
414
Miller considered similar issues. There, the defendant challenged a
judgment from a criminal contempt proceeding that he violated a
court order prohibiting him from operating a paramilitary organiza415
tion.
The prosecutor in the contempt proceeding had previously
represented the plaintiffs in a suit against the defendant, resulting in
416
the court order at issue. The district court held that the U.S. Attor-

411
412
413
414
415
416

Id. at 809.
Id. at 809–14.
See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658.
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ney’s Office was required to take control, but that the interested at417
torney could still assist in the prosecution.
Ostensibly relying on the fact that Young does not prohibit interested attorneys from all involvement in a criminal contempt prosecu418
tion, but rather frowns on their management of such cases, the
Fourth Circuit upheld private counsel’s participation so long as the
419
government approved and retained control of the prosecution.
The Court’s underlying concern that the victims’ priorities may
take precedence over the more ephemeral, but no less important,
demands of “justice” is understandable. This concern, however,
bears closer scrutiny. Does the public’s interest count for more than
the victim’s interest? Should it? Are prosecutors, even those privately
retained, who work under the same ethical constraints as public prosecutors—albeit with perhaps different incentives—necessarily less
likely to make decisions that benefit justice, writ large, to the benefit
of their clients? After all, public prosecutors may identify with their
victims or may place political advancement paramount in their careers. The ranks of elected officialdom are littered with former prosecutors. To think that a public prosecutor’s interests may be any
more noble than a private attorney’s is likely more a hope than a reality.
Part of the answer to these concerns may depend upon the way in
which the system of private prosecutions is structured. The legal profession has long barred arrangements wherein criminal defense law420
yers are paid only if they win an acquittal for their clients. This may
have something not only to do with the “troubling” incentive created
when a lawyer is only compensated when he successfully obtains an
acquittal, but also with the prospect of what lawyers may do to collect
their fees. Private prosecutors, if supervised by their public counterparts, and paid on an hourly, not a contingency basis, may not be any
less likely to twist justice than a public prosecutor who becomes
committed to the victim’s cause or who is using his office for political

417
418

419
420

Id. at 659.
See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 806 n.17 (1987) (“The
potential for misconduct that is created by the appointment of an interested prosecutor is
not outweighed by the fact that counsel for the beneficiary of the court order may often
be most familiar with the allegedly contumacious conduct.”).
Person, 854 F.2d at 664.
See Ormerod v. Dearman, 100 Pa. 561, 564 (1882) (rejecting such an arrangement);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2006) (prohibiting lawyers from entering into such fee arrangements); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 39–41 (1989) (discussing the
policy of proscribing contingent fees in criminal cases).
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ambitions. Nevertheless, the conflict issue is one that bears further
consideration.
2. The Utility of Private Justice Models
If the ends of the criminal law are to punish the guilty and thereby
to ensure enforcement of the law by achieving a greater measure of
deterrence, it bears considering whether the leveraging of private resources will help attain these goals. While there is an insufficient
number of private prosecutions from which to draw any sort of verifiable conclusion, private justice has long been used to enforce rights.
Private rights of action and qui tam suits have traditionally existed as a
means of harnessing private resources to obtain significant public
421
policy objectives.
Professor Pamela H. Bucy has produced one of the more thoughtful examinations of the utlity of private rights of action. Focusing on
different forms of private justice—“victim” actions designed to make
the victim whole, “common good” actions that permit anyone to
bring suit to address public harms, and “hybrid” actions that contain
422
elements of the other two —Professor Bucy concludes that using
private means to enforce public law has generally not performed well
423
in the past. Although Professor Bucy acknowledged that “[p]rivate
424
justice is inevitable,” she concludes that only the “common good”
425
type qui tam action found in the False Claims Act is effective. And
she reasons that is so because, first, it enables a venue to recognize
the value of inside information (namely, knowledge that someone
has filed a fraudulent claim) and second, because it contains a “dualplaintiff mechanism” that permits both “government monitoring and
control of private actions” and promotes “cooperation between public and private regulators” to ensure that the privately managed litiga426
tion serves the public interest.
Professor Bucy measures “success” in somewhat different terms
427
In parfrom what a successful criminal prosecution might bring.
421
422
423

424
425
426
427

See Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 851, 863–64 (2006) (discussing the orgins of qui tam actions).
Bucy, supra note 289, at 13.
Id. at 62–68. Several other examples highlight this criticism. Bucy identifies the high
dismissal rate of private prosecutions of RICO cases as an indication of lack of merit. Id.
at 22. Bucy also identifies the burdens on defendants and courts from private securities
litigation prior to congressional reform. Id. at 26–29.
Id. at 79.
See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
Bucy, supra note 289, at 80.
Id. at 54.
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ticular, she faults “victim” efforts that focus only on single instances of
wrongdoing to recompense one specific victim and therefore have little overall impact on the “overall regulation of complex economic
428
wrongdoing.” Professor Bucy also criticizes “hybrid” efforts for fail429
ing to attract talented litigators. However, neither of these criticisms
need to pertain to private prosecutions. For example, if the concern
is that existing citizen suits fail to attract sufficient legal talent to investigate or pursue the often complicated issues that arise in antitrust,
environmental, or other regulatory suits, it must be understood that
criminal prosecutions tend to involve both more motivated victims
and considerably less complex factual predicates. Few criminal
prosecutions involve large corporate entities (the traditional targets
of RICO, antitrust, and environmental litigation), nor are they intended to contribute to a broader regulatory scheme. Instead, even
fairly minor criminal prosecutions (for violent crimes or drugs) are
understood both to deter the individual malefactor (via selective incapacitation) as well as to contribute to a larger scheme of deterrence.
That said, this is not to suggest that the government wholly abdicate its traditional role in supervising criminal prosecutions. Certainly, the presiding prosecutorial authority in a given jurisdiction
could be required to sign off on the final decision to bring a case to a
grand jury or even, in the event an indictment is handed down, to
press on to a criminal trial. Professor Bucy argues that governmental
supervision is a necessary component of any scheme of private jus430
tice, and this important suggestion could be included in any system
of privately managed criminal prosecutions.
C. Answering the Criticisms: Legal Protections for the Accused
Although the concerns raised about private prosecutions are not
insubstantial, it must not be forgotten that legal protections for the
accused permeate the criminal justice system. Much of the Bill of
Rights works as a code of criminal procedure, designed to protect the
defendant’s liberty and property interests. Those rights help ensure a
fair trial by guaranteeing certain minimal procedural protections to
the accused. Those protections help to guarantee fairness and a
credible outcome regardless of who prosecutes the case.

428
429
430

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 78.
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1. Pretrial Rights
The accused’s interests are greatest before a prosecution even
commences. Nothing, of course, currently prevents a victim from retaining a private investigator and gathering evidence in a case. While
a private investigator’s powers pale in comparison to those of the police, they can undertake interviews and collect evidence—with some
important exceptions. The Fourth Amendment restricts the ways in
431
which police may collect evidence.
For example, if the police unlawfully gather evidence by conducting a search without a warrant,
432
that evidence is excludable at trial. Similarly, if the police obtain a
confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment, there is a good
433
The safeguards of
chance that confession will not be admissible.
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, however, only apply to state ac434
tors.
Therefore, private investigators are not subject to the same
sort of rigor in terms of their collection of evidence and gathering of
statements as their public counterparts.
Although private parties currently may retain private investigators
to collect evidence, one way of ensuring compliance with constitutional norms would be for private prosecution statutes to exclude
evidence gathered (by private parties) in violation of standard police
practices. At a minimum, such a rule would provide defendants with
the same sort of procedural protections they enjoy when the police
lead an investigation. Of course, if the police were working with private counsel, the same strictures would naturally apply.
In addition, restrictions on standing would limit the universe of
potential complainants. If private prosecutions are available only to
the victims themselves, or to their immediate families, vigilante-type
actions initiated by interest groups would not be possible. As with civil lawsuits, keeping the potential pool of plaintiffs small serves a useful function to ensure that cases are brought only where there is a
real harm and a motivated victim.

431
432
433

434

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in court).
Id.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that a prosecution may not use
statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless necessary procedural safeguards are followed). For some of the possible exceptions, see Susan R. Klein,
Miranda’s Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567 (2001).
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (expaining that the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to government actors).
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Once evidence is collected, whether by private investigators acting
at the behest of a victim, or by public law enforcement officials, a useful safeguard would be to require the public prosecutor to certify that
the case is neither frivolous nor a violation of the public’s interest.
Prosecutors traditionally wield considerable power in deciding
whether to go forward with a case:
[T]he prosecutor has become the most powerful office in the criminal
justice system. The prosecutor’s authority is evident in bail hearings,
grants of immunity, and in trial strategy. But in the areas of charging,
bargaining, and sentencing, it has become clear that the prosecutor plays
the pivotal role in the criminal justice process. Despite criticism, plea
bargaining continues unabated. While few courts have rather unsuccessfully attempted to formulate a ‘common law of prosecutorial discretion,’
435
the authority of the prosecutor continues to grow.

Given the understandable concerns about the interest motivating the
private prosecutor, it is not unreasonable to interpose the public
prosecutor in the decision whether to take a private prosecution to
the grand jury (or to proceed with a criminal information).
The ABA has, in fact, adopted standards for prosecutors with respect to their charging decisions, including:
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor
knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and
for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute,
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a
conviction. . . .
....
(d) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give
no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which
might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record of convictions.
....
(f) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or
436
than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.

435
436

Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 741–
42 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3–
3.9 (1993).
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While these rules lack the force of law, a statute allowing for privately managed prosecutions could make these rules or other similar
rules binding on private attorneys conducting such prosecutions.
Additionally, legislatures could limit the crimes available for private prosecution. Much like the creation of private rights of action in
civil suits, policymakers could select those crimes that, as a policy
matter, make the most sense as private prosecutions. One could argue that fairly trivial crimes, such as shoplifting or misdemeanor
theft, might be more appropriate for private prosecution. Shop owners, for example, might be perfectly situated to pursue minor shoplifting offenses. Alternatively, in circumstances of truly serious crime,
it might be in the interests of the community to leverage private interests as a means of securing more efficient law enforcement. Determining precisely what crimes may be pursued by private prosecution should be entrusted to legislators, who work to secure the
interests of those they represent and who can, more adroitly than the
courts, adjust those determinations in light of the actual results of
cases privately prosecuted.
Finally, grand juries could be used to screen out trivial matters or
cases that are more about personal vendetta than justice. In the federal system, grand juries serve to decide whether a criminal case may
go forward. Although the grand jury requirement of the Fifth
437
Amendment has never been incorporated against the states, many
states already have grand juries and they can be used as an important
barrier against the possibility of frivolous or malicious prosecution.
2. Trial Rights
Once the decision has been made to go forward with a criminal
case after grand jury indictment, important trial rights exist to secure
the accused’s interests. Regardless of the grand jury’s decision to indict, public prosecutors could still enjoy the authority to decide
whether the interest of justice demands trial—exactly as they do in
cases which they themselves manage.
Protections for the defendant, whether a case is managed privately
438
or not, are numerous. A judge presides over the trial itself and has

437
438

See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (stating that “the judge must exert
substantial control over [judicial] proceedings”); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466,
469 (1933) (describing the discretionary power of a judge in a jury trial).
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an obligation to ensure that the defendant’s rights are preserved.
Even in plea bargains, where the defendant elects to waive trial, a
440
judge ordinarily must accept the terms of that agreement. In a situation involving a privately managed prosecution, the public prosecutor might also ensure that the plea reflects the interests of justice
and the trial judge might subject such agreements to closer scrutiny
before approving them.
The same judges who preside in prosecutions managed by public
officers would, of course, preside in trials managed by privately hired
prosecutors. Judges in such privately managed prosecutions might,
as in pro se cases, be somewhat more inclined to police the proceedings to ensure that private counsel acts in an appropriate manner.
Indeed, an additional layer of protection could be adopted by requiring judges to certify the appointment of a private prosecutor retained
by the victim.
As with public prosecution, all the rights and privileges accorded
the criminal defendant would be present in a private prosecution.
The private prosecutor would be required to prove each element of
441
the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant
would enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self442
443
incrimination, be able to present witnesses and subpoena those
444
445
who refused to testify voluntarily, enjoy the right to counsel, and
maintain all the other attendant trial-related rights. Most importantly, the greatest guarantor of liberty, the right to a jury determina446
tion, would similarly be preserved. The only functional difference
between the privately managed prosecution and the public prosecution would be the nature and authority of the individual presenting
the case.

439
440
441
442
443
444

445
446

See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (stating that the judge must ensure
that the defendant’s essential rights are protected).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4).
See supra note 358.
See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S 479, 485–86 (1951) (describing Fifth Amendment
prohibition on any person being a witness against himself).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (explaining that
the right to present witnesses is an element of due process of law).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (stating that
criminal defendants have the right to government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38, 40 (1972) (holding
that no person may be denied his liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (holding
that the Constitution guarantees a right of jury trial in serious criminal cases).
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While the Framers of the Bill of Rights included numerous procedural protections for the accused, at no point did they guarantee the
nature or quality of the prosecutor. Neither the Framers nor those
who drafted the various state constitutions deemed it necessary to include public prosecutors as part of the “protections” guaranteed to
criminal defendants. In fact, given the Framers’ interests in balancing natural avarice and ambition through a carefully calibrated system of checks and balances, it would be surprising if they would consider a public prosecutor’s interest in “justice” to be an appropriate
check against untoward behavior. Procedural rules, bar discipline,
impartial judges, and, ultimately, the buffer provided by a jury of
one’s peers, would likely have been deemed a better means of guaranteeing the defendant’s rights in the context of an adversarial trial.
3. Ancillary Protections
Aside from the traditional protections granted the defendant, several other potential means of guaranteeing the defendant’s interests
could also be considered. First, since the early establishment of public prosecutors, such government officials have often enjoyed the au447
448
thority to terminate a case, even after grand jury indictment, if the
public interest demanded it. Public prosecutors could thus enjoy the
authority not only to certify a prosecution and approve the appointment of particular counsel, but also to terminate a case at any stage of
the proceeding. The power to terminate a prosecution on public interest grounds could be a significant means of preventing the possibility of an inappropriate prosecution or one that violates the public
interest.
Two additional protections could also be considered: suits for ma449
licious prosecution and the assessment of defense costs on the
complainant if any inappropriate conduct is found with respect to the
private counsel. The threat of a suit for a malicious prosecution
could serve as a significant deterrent to someone filing a suit to harass the accused or that is otherwise inappropriate. While public
prosecutors are protected by sovereign immunity, if immunity protec-

447
448
449

See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the termination
of a prosecution should not be determined by a judge).
See United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1463 (10th Cir. 1985) (describing a prosecutor’s authority to dismiss indictments).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (allowing civil suits against state actors for civil rights violations).
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tion was waived when private counsel undertook a case, the possibility
450
of a tort action could serve as a deterrent against misconduct.
Similarly, if a court decides that the prosecution was not conducted in good faith, defense costs could be assessed against the
complainant. Such a deterrent would likewise not be available
against a public prosecutor, but it would be useful in discouraging inappropriate private prosecutions.
Finally, as with all criminal prosecutions, statutory rights of appeal
ensure that an appellate court (either federal or state) will have the
opportunity to review the trial record to consider any claims the defendant might make as to the appropriateness of the privately managed prosecution. Appellate courts can thus act as a check upon any
problems fomented by the use of a private prosecutor.
IV. PRIVATE PROSECUTORS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD RECONSIDERED
Presently, most law enforcement strategies demand government
participation in the form of investigating alleged criminal conduct,
leading the prosecution, collecting the fines, or running the prison
facilities. At least part of the reason government came to dominate
criminal prosecution stems from the notion that law enforcement
represents a public good that is best financed by society and delivered
by public actors. The prosecution guilds of the past simply merged
and transferred their authority to government while spreading the
costs to society as a whole. The state, however, need not monopolize
the investigation and prosecution of crime. The public may benefit
from the government leveraging private resources in the form of increased criminal prosecutions and conserved public expenditures.
Several examples exist in which society may gain from permitting pri451
vately managed prosecutions as an addendum to public efforts.
A. Contours of a Model Statute
If one accepts that private resources ought to be harnessed to enforce the law and that privately managed prosecutions may prove to
be one vital piece of that effort, it is worth considering what a model
statute authorizing private prosecutions might contain. I suggest only
the basic contours of such a stature here, as the numerous potential
450

451

See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–73 (1993) (describing how a public prosecutor’s absolute immunity extends to actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom).
See generally Comment, supra note 327 (arguing private prosecution could remedy unwarranted inaction by public prosecutors).
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jurisdictions involved—the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government—will undoubtedly have idiosyncrasies of
their own when it comes to how their criminal justice systems function.
First, private prosecutions should only be limited to certain classes
of crimes. While, for reasons discussed below, it may be useful to
permit private prosecutions for both felonies and misdemeanors, certain crimes do not readily lend themselves to private prosecutions.
The most obvious example of crimes that ought to remain within the
452
exclusive purview of public prosecutors is strict liability offenses.
Strict liability offenses are unique within the criminal law as they require no proof of intent; such crimes generally reflect society’s decision that certain acts merit criminal punishment regardless of whether the perpetrator intended to commit them. Because society decides
to exempt certain offenses from mens rea requirements, it makes sense
to allow only public prosecutors to bring those cases. The mens rea
453
requirement in traditional offenses provides the defendant with an
additional protection against ill-advised prosecution and, hence, it is
more suitable for private prosecution. Similarly, public order offenses, such as rioting or disorderly conduct where there is no discernable victim, and crimes against the state, such as treason, espionage, or counterfeiting, should be left to public prosecutors.
In most other respects, a private prosecution would mirror a standard public prosecution. The process for initiating a case would be
kicked off like any standard criminal prosecution. A complaint would
be sworn out, evidence collected and analyzed, and the private prosecutor would determine which, if any, crime was committed. The privately retained counsel would then bring the case to the appropriate
public prosecutor to determine whether the action ought to be maintained. The public prosecutor could choose to pursue the prosecution in house, quash the prosecution altogether, send the private
prosecutor back to assemble more evidence, or authorize the private
prosecutor to go forward.
Second, some level of oversight of private prosecutions by their
public counterparts will counter concerns that a privately managed
prosecution may be little more than a thinly veiled vendetta. Thus,
an appropriate statute might require the public prosecutor to sign off

452

453

See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1959) (recognizing the use of strict liability
offenses); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (explaining that scienter is
not always necessary to prove a crime).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (noting that most federal criminal
laws require a mens rea element).
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before a case is brought before a grand jury or before a criminal information is submitted. Typically, any case brought by a private prosecutor ought to face scrutiny by a grand jury, and formal indictment
ought to be the means by which a private criminal prosecution is
commenced. Interposing both the public prosecutor and the grand
jury between the filing of a case and trial should help prevent the filing of frivolous or revenge-driven prosecutions. In fact, if the jurisdiction does not permit indictment by grand jury, but only provides
that a criminal information be filed, all cases filed by a private prosecutor ought to be approved by a public prosecutor.
While the private prosecutor need not be officially “deputized” by
the U.S. attorney or the district attorney, all relevant constraints on
prosecutors generally, peculiar to the jurisdiction in which the prosecution is taking place, should likewise be made explicitly applicable
to private prosecutors. Private prosecutors, in fact, could be obligated to swear out a certificate in open court that they will abide by
the rules applicable to public prosecutors and that the prosecution
itself is being pursued in the interests of justice. Although public
prosecutors are generally shielded from suits for frivolous or vindictive prosecution—largely as a result of the immunity they enjoy as
454
state employees —such immunity should be waived for private prosecutors. Thus, a private prosecutor could face personal liability if, for
455
example, he failed to disclose Brady material, knowingly brought a
prosecution to harass the defendant, or did not file the suit in the interests of justice or to address the victim’s legitimate interests.
Moreover, to discourage frivolous or otherwise meritless prosecutions, a “loser pays” provision might be included so that in the event
the prosecutor failed to obtain a conviction and the judge found ex
456
ante that the case was not brought in good faith, the defendant
would be entitled to a reimbursement for attorney’s fees and court
costs. Although such a provision merits consideration, it must be approached with trepidation for two reasons in particular. Because
many defendants might have pro bono or state-provided counsel,
some reimbursements would go to the state, which may be inappropriate in the context of a criminal prosecution. Likewise, this incen454
455

456

See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976) (holding that a state prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding suppression of evidence by the
prosecutor violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”).
See David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the
“American Rule” and “English Rule”, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 589–90 (2005) (discussing the history of the “Loser Pays” rule in England).

Mar. 2010]

PRIVATE VENGEANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD

737

tive to “win” the case might conflict with the interests of justice, which
may become apparent only as the case unfolds. It may prove problematic to hinge the payment of defense attorneys’ fees and court
costs on whether a prosecution is successful. Nevertheless, such an
arrangement is worth considering.
Third, at the time of trial, the judge should be informed of, and
ultimately approve of, the appointment of private counsel to manage
the prosecution. A judge’s involvement in a privately managed prosecution may be useful in ensuring that such a prosecution is not
maintained for improper motives. As the New York Court of Appeals
once explained:
A prudent magistrate should proceed with the utmost caution when he
has reason to suspect that a criminal proceeding was commenced before
him, not to vindicate public justice, but to serve some private purpose,
and should withhold process until satisfied that the complainant is acting
in good faith in behalf [sic] of the people, and not to aid personal ob457
jects.

This is perhaps overstated in that, with a privately initiated prosecution, one would expect a personal interest motivating the prosecution, but that ought not be the sole motivation for pursuing the
cause. Nor is it clear why a personal motivation, as long as it is one
supported by evidence sufficient to support a grand jury indictment,
is necessarily a bad thing; requiring the trial judge to formally approve the appointment of private counsel at the time of trial may be a
prudent measure given the relative uniqueness of the proceeding. It
might be expected that, with the certification of the public prosecutor at the start of the process, judges would routinely consent to the
appointment of private counsel, but still, requiring judicial approval
at such a crucial stage in the proceeding establishes an additional level of protection to the defendant. In addition, all plea agreements
between a private prosecutor and the defendant should be approved
by the public prosecutor’s office in addition to the judge. Judges, of
458
course, supervise plea bargains
and must ultimately approve
459
them.
Seldom will a judge refuse a plea bargain negotiated by
460
counsel, but a judge apprised that the agreement was negotiated by
a private prosecutor might scrutinize such deals more carefully.

457
458
459
460

People ex rel Livingston v. Wyatt, 79 N.E. 330, 333 (N.Y. 1906).
See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 747 (2001).
See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
See Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 36
(2004) (explaining that a judge will usually accept an agreement reached by the parties).
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Fourth, private prosecutors should not be permitted to collect fees
contingent on a “successful” prosecution. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have long banned the collection of contingency
461
fees in criminal cases. Although this ban has been attacked by some
462
commentators, it remains in place in virtually every jurisdiction in
the United States. “[C]ontingent fees,” it has been explained, “create
complementary dangers of overzealous and compromised represen463
tation.”
Effectively, this overzealous representation theory “begins
from the premise that contingent fees make an attorney and her cli464
ent, in essence, joint venturers for the purpose of the litigation.”
And, “[b]ecause the lawyer’s fee, as well as her psychic satisfaction
and future reputation, will depend on the outcome of the proceeding, she will have, it is thought, a greater incentive to win, and thus a
greater incentive to engage in corrupt practices that enhance her
465
prospects of winning.” While this arrangement was analyzed in the
context of contingent fees for defense lawyers, the same basic reasoning applies to private prosecutors as well. Although Professor Pamela
Karlan questions whether this is a legitimate assumption to make, and
notes that “no hard empirical support [exists] for the proposition
that criminal defense lawyers are less capable of resisting these incen466
tives than . . . their civil counterparts,” one can perhaps make a
greater claim that a prosecutor, who has certain obligations beyond
those to the client/victim, ought not be in the position of accepting
fees contingent upon a successful prosecution of the defendant. To
remove all possibility of concern, the ban on contingency fees in
criminal cases ought to be maintained.
Similarly, prosecutors ought not be allowed to share in the proceeds from the collection of a criminal fine. A private prosecutor
should not be incentivized to seek the highest possible fine in order
to enrich himself. The simple solution to discourage such behavior is
simply to prevent either the lawyer or the client from sharing the
proceeds of any available fine. This differs, however, from the collection of restitution. The amount of restitution must be proven by the
victim; hence, it may not be inappropriate for a private prosecutor to

461
462

463
464
465
466

See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 595 (1993)
(suggesting that a continuing ban on contingent fees in criminal cases should be relaxed).
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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enter into an arrangement in which he will share in the proceeds of
any court-ordered restitution.
Fifth, the supervising public prosecutor should be able to terminate the prosecution “in the interests of justice” at any point either
prior to trial or on appeal. Endowing the public prosecutor with
such authority is plainly in accord with historical arrangements between public and private prosecutors, and furthers the government’s
interest in controlling criminal litigation. The defendant should always have the option of appealing to the public prosecutor to quash
the proceeding. This ability to terminate a prosecution will ensure
that frivolous or vengeful prosecutions are kept to a minimum.
B. Paradigmatic Examples Illustrating the Utility of Private Prosecutors
Private prosecutions, if they are to be resurrected and placed back
into the criminal justice system’s mainstream, must confer a benefit
on that system and should enjoy a comparative advantage over public
prosecutions in certain cases. Several concrete examples exist in
which, for a variety of reasons, a private prosecution may be preferred, or act as a compliment to a public prosecution.
If the overall number of prosecutions increases by permitting privately initiated cases, deterrence efforts ought to be more successful.
An increased number of prosecutions should have an effect upon
467
specific deterrence, in that a greater number of criminals will presumably face consequences for their actions. In the event the number of prosecutions increases, general deterrence efforts should also
468
benefit, as potential offenders see more individuals being prosecuted. Similarly, if the private bar is incentivized to engage in a certain amount of private sleuthing, the detection of crime will improve,
thereby providing greater bite to deterrence strategies.
Second, by leveraging private resources, state prosecutorial resources may be conserved and better directed at state or national priorities which may benefit indigent victims. While it has been argued
that private prosecutions inevitably allow the rich “better justice” than
the poor, there are alternate ways of looking at the issue. If the rich
command greater attention in the criminal justice system by virtue of
their wealth, one might argue they are already over-represented when
it comes to the investigation and prosecution of crime. The govern-

467
468

See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949,
950 (1966) (describing the effects of punishment on deterrence).
See id. at 960 (“Very few people would violate the law if there were a policeman on every
doorstep.”).
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ment operates with scarce resources; therefore, for every prosecution
it undertakes on behalf of a corporate victim—which may be beneficial because of the number of victims or the perceived benefit of a
greater deterrence—it must forgo (holding resources otherwise constant) some other potential prosecution. If, however, a well-heeled
victim can bring his own prosecution relying on his own resources,
then (provided the government’s commitment to criminal prosecution remains the same) the government’s resources are freed up and
may, arguably, be used on a prosecution that might benefit a victim
with access to fewer resources.
Aside from the overarching interests of improving deterrence efforts by increasing the overall number of prosecutions and conserving scarce government resources, private prosecutions may enjoy certain comparative advantages over those initiated by the government.
In certain situations, for example, the putative victim may have knowledge or skill lacked by the government to pursue a case. In such circumstances, a private prosecutor may be in a better position to press
a case. Moreover, some fairly common sorts of crimes may be difficult to prosecute either because they are so large they may consume a
disproportionate share of prosecutorial resources, and involve multiple victims, or are so small that they are simply ignored by prosecutors.
Finally, conflicts within a prosecutor’s office or circumstances in
which the police may be the offenders may demand that prosecution
comes from outside the public offices—much like the former federal
independent counsel statute, which prized independence from the
government in pursuing the prosecution of a public official. I will
thus offer several paradigmatic examples in which private prosecutions may offer a comparative advantage.
1. Specialized Knowledge
a. Computer Crime
469

470

With the transition of so much personal, financial, and corpo471
rate data to the Internet, not to mention the ability to communicate

469
470

See Reid Kanaley, The E-Files, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 8, 1999, at F1 (discussing the extent to
which individuals reveal personal information on the internet).
See Letitia Stein, Health Records Go from Cabinet to Computer, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 22,
2009, at A1 (describing how people have become comfortable managing their financial
information online).
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472

anonymously with people all over the world, the Internet has become a favorite target for fraudsters, hackers, and garden variety
473
Successful cybercrime, however, often requires fairly sothieves.
474
phisticated perpetrators who engage in careful planning. With the
world wide web being a vast collection of computers and servers scattered over the globe, cybercrime, in all its various guises, can be diffi475
cult to detect.
Even where the crimes themselves may be discov476
Such hurdles
ered, it is often difficult to identify the perpetrator.
make cybercrime challenging to prosecute. While governments
around the world have increased dramatically their efforts to battle
cybercrime, this is an endeavor in which government lacks any sort of
comparative advantage over private industry.
Private industry, with its access to well-paid programming talent,
enjoys an advantage over the government in terms of preventing, in477
vestigating, and detecting cybercrime. This is not, however, to denigrate government efforts: “[I]t is simply not possible for investigators and prosecutors to become instant experts in every type of
system, in light of the wide array of computers and operating systems
on the market. . . . We will often need the victim to assist us in our ef478
forts.” The government does not, and cannot, maintain a monopoly over the specialized knowledge to detect and prosecute cyber-

471

472

473

474

475

476

477

478

See Erin Ailworth, Firms Sending Investors to the Web: While Corporations Save Cash by Putting
Shareholder Data Online, Printers Lose Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 2009, at B5 (describing how much corporate data is posted online).
See Al Teich et al., Anonymous Communication Policies for the Internet: Results and Recommendations of the AAAS Conference (The Info. Soc’y, Working Copy Version 14, 1999) (noting
that anonymous communication is a valuable feature of the internet).
See Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Consumers:
Dot Cons (Oct. 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/tech/tec09.shtm (last visited Feb. 16,
2010) (describing ways in which con artists use the internet to defraud consumers).
See Phillip Hallam-Baker, Prevention Strategies for the Next Wave of Cyber Crime, NETWORK
SECURITY, Oct. 2005, at 12, available at http://complianceandprivacy.com/WhitePapers
/VeriSign-NESE-20051005.pdf (analyzing various types of cyber crime).
See Securities Fraud on the Internet: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 106th Cong. 25–31 (1999) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Associate Director of Financial Institutions and Markets Issues, General Government Division)
(noting some of the challenges of regulating cybercrime).
See id. at 27 (“Another ongoing challenge is coordinating oversight
amongst . . . regulators[.] . . . Internet frauds can be initiated from virtually anywhere in
the world.”).
See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 279 (2000) (describing private victims’ ability to detect and punish
cybercriminals).
Id. at 276–77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 946 (1996)).
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479

criminals. If the talent to pursue cybercriminals lies in the hands of
private industry, so does the incentive to ferret it out:
The infrastructures at issue are largely privately owned. Those private owners have a substantial economic stake in protecting their investments . . . . Those who own and operate these systems are in the best position to understand and prioritize this range of threats and what is
480
necessary to mitigate them.

Indeed, government officials have themselves recognized the need
for private actors to become involved:
[G]overnments, even if we all work together, will not be able to meet
these challenges alone. We need the private sector to be involved. In
fact, the private sector must take the lead in certain areas, especially in
protecting private computer networks, through more vigilant security efforts, information sharing, and, where appropriate, through cooperation
481
with government agencies.

While the government may need to target more immediate needs,
and distribute its resources accordingly, the private sector may be
able to commit its resources, particularly adept at detecting and investigating, to prosecute certain cybercriminals.
In fact, cooperation among private sector industries may work to
provide significant deterrence for potential cybercriminals. Companies may have the same incentives that the guilds of old had to band
together and fund the investigation and prosecution of cybercriminals. Where prosecution is all but assured once a cybercrime is detected, the private sector players may be incentivized to cooperate to
482
deter such crimes. Ultimately, such private efforts may dramatically
increase the security of the internet.

479

480

481
482

See Internet Security: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th
Cong. 26 (2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI, National
Infrastrucure Protection Programs) (describing the use of cyber intrusion to implement a
criminal conspiracy by Vladimir L. Levin); see also James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney
Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the International Computer
Crime Conference: Internet as the Scene of Crime (May 29–31, 2000), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/roboslo.htm (arguing that government
cannot meet the challenges of cybercrime without support from the private sector).
Michael J. O’Neil & James X. Dempsey, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats to Privacy
and Other Civil Liberties and Concerns with Government Mandates on Industry, 12 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 97, 103 (1999/2000) (footnote omitted).
Robinson, supra note 479.
For a demonstration that people often resolve their disputes cooperatively without the
use of law, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991). See also Bruce L. Benson, Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle: Might Takes
and Makes Rights, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 129, 129 (1994) (suggesting that violence over
scarce resources may be avoided if property rights develop along with voluntary participation in a governance scheme).
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b. White Collar Financial Fraud
A second example where privately managed prosecutions might
prove beneficial is in the context of pursuing white collar fraud
crimes. As of this writing, the United States is in the middle of its
most significant economic recession in at least a quarter-century.
Fraud cases abound. In certain situations, victims may be better positioned to mount an investigation and then marshal the resources to
privately prosecute a cause. Shareholder suits have been useful tools
483
to address shareholder losses. Suits such as those brought by Tyco
International shareholders against PricewaterhouseCoopers for its
role in an accounting fraud scheme that ended with several of Tyco’s
484
principal executives going to prison have been successful.
Under such circumstances, the opportunity for disgruntled shareholders to bring a privately managed criminal case against the fraudulent players may be a reasonable way of ensuring justice. The victims, for example, may be able to provide forensic accounting
methods far superior to those available to the government. Moreover, they may be better situated to invest the resources necessary to
pursue a complex fraud case of this sort not only by expending resources, but also by being in a better position to organize potential
witnesses.
A complex fraud investigation of this sort can demand an enormous commitment of resources, not just in terms of attorney time,
but also in the services of economists, forensic accountants, and fi485
The government might find its resources
nancial analysts.
stretched to the breaking point if it were forced to investigate multiple fraud cases of this magnitude and might be forced to forgo certain investigations or prosecutions altogether. By leveraging private
resources, it becomes easier to pursue multiple fraud investigations,
and if corporations with substantial resources pursue fraud, government resources may be freed to assist fraud victims who lack the ability to prosecute themselves.
483

484

485

See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J.
1733, 1733 (1994) (explaining that shareholder suits are the primary mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers).
See Chad Bray, Court Upholds Convictions of Former Tyco Executives, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008,
at B3 (reporting that the New York Court of Appeals upheld the convictions of former
Tyco officials); Sarah Johnson, PwC Settles Tyco Case for $225M, CFO, July 6, 2007,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/ 9461453?f=related (describing $225 million dollar class
action settlement).
See Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance: Perceptions of Influence in Insurance Fraud Prosecutions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 366 (2008) (noting the many resources necessary to stage a financial fraud prosecution).
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c. Trademark and Copyright Enforcement
Another useful avenue for private prosecutions might be in the
context of criminal trademark and copyright violations. With the advent of the Internet, and the ease with which media may be copied
486
and distributed, copyright law has become increasingly important.
487
Illegal music downloading has been rampant, and in the last decade, the recording industry has sought to pursue illegal download488
ers.
While the publishing and recording industries have sought,
489
with limited success, to enjoin violators, criminal prosecutions have
490
also been used in an effort to deter unlawful conduct. In 2008, for
example, Kevin Cogill pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor
criminal copyright infringement for illegally uploading nine prerelease Guns N’ Roses tracks for the long-awaited album, “Chinese
491
Democracy.” Geffen Records, a division of the largest record label
492
493
group, Universal Music Group (UMG), pressed the case.
While no one would begrudge Geffen’s right to distribute its
property as it (and Axl Rose) sees fit, one might question the allocation of government resources to prosecute an individual (not an organization) who distributed nine pre-release Guns N’ Roses tracks.
Geffen would doubtless be in a better position than the government

486

487

488

489

490

491
492
493

See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 63–
65 (2002/2003) (describing copyright law as an evolving body of law capable of providing
protection for creative works in the digital age).
See Chad Silver, Censure the Tree for Its Rotten Apple: Attributing Liability to Parents for the Copyright Infringement of Their Minor Children, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 977, 977
(2006) (“Illegally downloading music is a common practice among children and one
more serious than it may initially appear.”).
See Mikel R. Boeve, Will Internet Service Providers Be Forced to Turn in Their Copyright Infringing Customers? The Power of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Subpoena Provision After In
Re Charter Communications, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 117, 118–20 (2006) (describing Recording Industry Association of America efforts to curb copyright infringement, including software tracking and copyright infringement suit filing).
See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1001, 1018 (2002) (noting negotiations with the record companies and music publishers “did nothing to prepare either one for the vastly increased ability of consumers to
themselves copy and distribute sound recordings”).
See Valerie R. Sherman, Note, Bootleggers Beware: United States v. Martignon Upholds Congressional Power to Enact “Copyright-Like” Legislation Through the Commerce Clause, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 185, 188 (2008) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2319A “imposes criminal penalties on a
person who infringes an author’s copyright by recording and distributing the author’s
live musical performances”).
Dave Itzkoff, Copyright Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at C2.
Kate Holton, Warner Overtakes EMI in Recorded Market Share-Data, REUTERS, July 18, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ technology-media-telco-SP/idUSL1781138320070718.
Michelle Quinn & Swati Pandey, Blogger Arrested in Music Leak, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008,
at C1.
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to track and identify those who would infringe upon its property
rights. And, in the event blood could not be squeezed from a turnip
in the context of a civil suit, why not permit the company to prosecute the case itself?
A similar situation arises in the context of movies and books. Why
not permit Marvel Comics the opportunity to track and prosecute
those persons who would illegally distribute pirated copies of the
Spider-Man or Ironman movies or their companion comic books? In
all likelihood, many of those violating criminal copyright and trademark laws would not be organized criminal conspiracies, but would
instead be individuals. Given the amount of illegal downloading and
distribution of copyrighted materials on the web, it would be more
efficient to let the companies with an interest in protecting their copyrighted materials monitor, track, and ultimately prosecute those
who would violate their rights. The sheer volume of such infringements makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the government to pursue such violations.
Nor is it at all clear that the government should, or would, prioritize such cases. To an interested industry, however, considerable motivation would exist for them to pursue violators. Presumably, if a
larger number of violators were prosecuted without using scarce government resources, greater deterrence would be obtained and the
overall number of such violations might decrease. As it stands, many
offenders discount the likelihood they will ever be apprehended,
much less prosecuted.
2. Collective Action Issues
a. Environmental Crimes
Environmental crimes typically involve the unauthorized disposal
494
of hazardous material or discharge of pollutants. Such crimes have
increasingly come to the fore as society has gained a greater under495
standing of the seriousness of such offenses. Even a fairly small infraction, such as dumping used batteries in a landfill or draining
chemical fertilizers into creeks and ponds may have dangerous longterm effects. Often, it is not a single action, in and of itself, that

494
495

Martin Harrell et al., Federal Environmental Crime: A Different Kind of “White Collar” Prosecution, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2009, at 3, 3.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 217 (1991) (“Obviously, environmental crime is important, and knowing violations . . . do not merit leniency.”).
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causes significant harm, but instead the culmination of a series of
496
Unfortunately, the resources committed to fight envisuch acts.
ronmental crimes tend to trail those committed to investigate and
prosecute traditional common law crimes that are commonly viewed
as more serious and immediately threatening to society. To the extent such prosecutions are brought, they tend to be brought against
large players and for grave infractions. Fairly minor offenses, despite
their potential harm, tend to go unremarked, and the sentences for
environmental crimes seldom reflect their harm to society. Concern
about harsh sentences, particularly in innocuous cases where the
criminal intent is unclear, has led to complaints about raising penalties for such offenses.
Environmental lobbying groups, however, enjoy considerable
497
498
popular support and are often well-funded. If such groups were
empowered to investigate and prosecute environmental crimes on
behalf of specified victims, it might be possible to increase levels of
awareness about such crimes and, correspondingly, increase deterrence such that penalties themselves need not be adjusted. An increase in the likelihood of prosecution, in and of itself, may help discourage such activities and, as a result, the penalties themselves may
not need adjusting.
b.

Community Initiatives

Other more minor crimes, which nevertheless can have a significant cumulative effect, may also be good candidates for private prosecutions. Shoplifting, one of the most common crimes in the United
States, is not often prosecuted. District attorneys’ offices seldom want
to commit substantial resources to combat what is a fairly minor offense. However, such offenses are costly to the retail industry. Not
unlike the problem with environmental crimes, shoplifting has an
enormous cumulative effect upon the economy. While the penalties
for shoplifting could be increased substantially, few would consider
that fair. Instead, a sound deterrence strategy would be to increase
the likelihood of detection and prosecution. If detection is in496
497

498

Jason M. Lemkin, Deterring Environmental Crime Through Flexible Sentencing: A Proposal for
the New Organizational Environmental Sentencing Guidelines, 84 CAL. L. REV. 307, 330 (1996).
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1567 (2007) (describing popular support for a clean environment).
See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of Collective Action, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 9, 27 (1998) (“Former student protesters may now be active primarily through their checkbooks . . . .”).
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creased, without the threat of a subsequent prosecution, however, deterrence efforts would founder. Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that
public officials will ever commit significant resources to prosecute
such offenses. If a large retailer such as Walmart, however, when plagued with losses stemming from shoplifting, could prosecute these
infractions, they might be able to attain a greater level of deterrence,
or again like the guilds of bygone eras, the retailers in a shopping
mall may unite to prosecute shoplifters. Presumably, at least some offenders, faced with an increased likelihood of both detection and
prosecution, may be deterred.
499
This “broken windows” approach to minor offenses extends also
to interested communities. Numerous communities across the country are plagued with “open air” crimes such as drug trafficking or
prostitution. While vice squads will occasionally conduct neighborhood sweeps, many such crimes, even if readily detected, go unprosecuted. And for good reason—available public resources tend to be
devoted, as they should, to more serious offenses. If a community
decides that to improve its quality of life it needs to work with the police to bring private prosecutions for relatively minor offenses such as
public drunkenness, prostitution, or overt drug dealing, then permitting it to do so may well go far in cleaning up troubled neighborhoods. While it is true that many such neighbors will lack sufficient
resources to hire a private prosecutor, some will be able to gather the
necessary resources and others may have the opportunity for pro bono legal assistance from the private bar. Regardless, if some prosecutions occur, they may prove to have a significant deterrent effect in
neighborhoods blighted by criminal activity. Often, it may not be
enough simply for the police to disrupt such activities; instead a prosecution must follow. If private resources can be marshaled to improve the community’s health, should they be prohibited?
3. Alleviating Potential Conflicts Within the Public Prosecutor’s Office
One additional circumstance in which privately managed prosecutions might play a role is when the public prosecutor’s office may
have a conflict of interest. Ordinarily, in situations such as when a
member of the prosecutor’s office is under criminal investigation, the

499

James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Feb. 1989, at 46, 46–52, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
crime/safehood.htm (“[T]he problem of ‘broken windows’: If the first broken window in
a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no
one cares about the building and more windows will be broken.”).
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prosecution will be maintained by a different office (either a neigh500
boring jurisdiction or a separate sovereign) or will be brought by
501
With respect to federal
specially appointed independent counsel.
502
law, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which
created the independent prosecutor as an acknowledgement of the
inherent conflict that exists whenever a member of the Executive
503
Branch comes under criminal investigation.
While most offices presumably have protocols in place for dealing
with official misconduct and while criminal violations by government
actors hopefully are aberrations, it has been argued that in certain
circumstances government agencies are slow to prosecute wrongdoing by government actors. Human Rights Watch, for example, has
accused local governments and federal officials alike of failing to pur504
sue instances of police brutality.
The organization alleges that shoddy internal investigations failed
to hold police officers accountable for abusive acts and that prosecu505
tors seldom pursued criminal investigations. Whether such abuses
are as common as they have been alleged, an important point remains: government is probably not at its best when forced to investigate itself. The Constitution’s Framers understood the need for a system of carefully calibrated checks and balances. The various bar
associations throughout the country similarly understand the importance of addressing potential conflicts of interest. It is doubtless difficult to investigate and prosecute, one of your “own.” In fact, the
criminal prosecution of police officers remains infrequent. “Local
prosecutors might be reluctant to pursue cases against officers accused of criminal civil rights violations because they typically work
506
closely with police to prosecute criminals.” The federal prosecution
507
of officers under criminal civil rights statutes is equally rare. In Fis-

500
501
502

503
504
505
506
507

CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS STANDARDS IN BUSINESS, HEALTH, AND
LAW 777–78 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999).
Id. at 778.
See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 594, 92 Stat. 1824, 1869
(1978) (“[A] special prosecutor . . . shall have . . . full power and independent authority to
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of
Justice . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2310
(1998) (describing the history of the Ethics in Government Act).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1998).
Id. at 85.
Id.
See id. at 93 (reporting that of the 10,129 civil rights cases reviewed in 1996, merely .2 percent “resulted in official misconduct cases filed for prosecution”).
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cal Year 2007 (the latest date for which information is available), for
example, the Justice Department touted:
From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, the Department of Justice convicted over 50 percent more defendants with official misconduct, or color
of law, violations than were convicted from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal
508
year 2000 (391 vs. 256).

Three hundred ninty-one prosecutions in a six-year period in light of
the thousands of state and federal law enforcement officials suggests
that either the ranks of law enforcement are particularly pure, or
such cases are simply not being pursued.
While special counsels can be established to pursue such cases,
there exists a role for privately managed prosecutions undertaken by,
or on behalf of, victims. Civil rights organizations, for example,
might be eager to pursue such cases. Although care must be taken in
such situations, basic conflict of interest principles suggest that a
prosecutor acting outside the government’s employ may be wellpositioned to pursue such cases.
CONCLUSION
The power to bring a criminal prosecution carries with it great responsibility. So great is that responsibility and so awesome the power
wielded by a prosecutor that it is cabined by numerous procedural
protections such as grand jury presentment and judicial approval. As
a historical matter, victims once often initiated criminal prosecutions.
For the victim, the criminal prosecution enabled him to vindicate his
interests, receive restitution for his loss, and achieve a certain amount
of personal justice. Over time, with the expansion of government,
the number of private prosecutions began to wane and government
began to monopolize law enforcement. Such prosecutions never
wholly disappeared, however; indeed a number of states continue to
allow privately managed criminal prosecutions. At the same time private criminal prosecutions have waned, the use of private attorneys
general and the institution of private causes of action have become
common means of augmenting states’ law enforcement efforts.
Although many scholars have argued that criminal defendants
have a constitutional right to an “impartial” (i.e., public) prosecutor,
the Supreme Court has never so held. Nor is it clear that defendants
ought to possess such a right on due process or equal protection

508

Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Hate Crimes and Prosecution of Civil Rights Violations (Nov.
15, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07_crt_921.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2010).
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grounds. The Framers of both the Constitution and Bill of Rights,
doubtless aware of the existence of private criminal prosecutions,
recognized the need to protect defendants’ interests, and therefore
established important procedural protections to ensure that criminal
trials would be fair. While the Framers explicitly provided rights to
counsel, grand juries, impartial judges, public trials, and petite juries,
private prosecutions were never forbidden.
Empowering victims to bring such actions, in addition to commanding historical support, has considerable attraction. Aside from
providing the victim with a sense of “justice,” privately managed criminal prosecutions may improve criminal law enforcement overall.
509
Not unlike Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand,” private
prosecutions themselves may benefit not only the individual victim,
but the public at large. Private vengeance, rightly pursued, may lead
to public good. After all, the resources government may designate to
enforce criminal laws are necessarily scarce. As criminals, at least
those for whom crime is a rational choice, decide to engage in prohibited conduct, they inevitably weigh the likelihood of detection,
510
prosecution, and expected punishment.
Accordingly, as the resources of private prosecutors are combined with those of the state,
the greater is the community’s capacity to detect and prosecute
crimes and punish the duly convicted.
Arguably, the most efficient way of increasing the deterrent effect
511
of the criminal law is to increase the likelihood of detection. If increased detection, however, is not buttressed by the likelihood of subsequent prosecution, deterrence goals may not be attained. Given
the limitations on increasing sanctions, private prosecutions may provide a useful means of leveraging private resources to combat crime
and thereby increase the likelihood of deterrence. If common-sense
restrictions of private prosecutions are adopted to protect the defendants’ interest in fair trials and to vindicate the public’s interest in
criminal law enforcement, such prosecutions should be permitted,
especially in circumstances in which the private prosecutor may hold
a comparative advantage over the public prosecutor, or in situations
in which the cost of a prosecution to the government may outweigh
its interests in pursuing the cause. Private prosecutions, while hardly
a panacea, may nevertheless usefully augment the efforts of government in enforcing the criminal law.
509
510
511

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176
(1968).
Id. at 176.

